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1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) principal source of revenue comes from issuers of rated secu-
rities, in the form of fees paid only if the issuer chooses to publish the rating obtained.1 To
receive any fees, rating agencies are thus effectively forced to give favorable ratings. To tackle
the resulting adverse selection problem, several commentators have proposed that issuers in-
stead be required to pay CRAs upfront, that is, independently of whether or not an issuer
received a favorable rating.2 However, the difficulty to monitor CRAs’ research activities adds
a moral hazard dimension to the problem of regulating the credit rating industry. As noted
by a US Senate report, during the build-up of the financial crisis “neither Moody’s nor S&P
hired sufficient staff or devoted sufficient resources to ensure that the initial rating process
... produced accurate credit ratings.”3 The primary goal of our paper is to argue that –in
the presence of moral hazard– contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire
information than upfront fees and to show that contingent fees can in fact result in more
information acquisition and higher social welfare than upfront fees.
We study a CRA rating an infinite sequence of short-lived firms. Each firm seeks to
finance a project with uncertain return. Costly information acquisition enables the agency
to determine those returns. However, whether the agency shirks or acquires information is
unobserved by firms and investors. Each period, the agency’s choice is between (a) acquiring
information to assign a favorable rating if and only if this period’s project is high return, and
(b) shirking and assigning a favorable rating automatically. In the spirit of Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) the agency is one of two private types, “committed”
or “strategic”. The committed agency makes choice (a) in all periods. The strategic agency
chooses between (a) and (b) with a view to maximize its expected intertemporal profit. The
reputation of the agency refers to firms and investors’ belief that the agency is committed.
Each period, the reputation of the agency is updated based on the accuracy of the last period’s
rating.
We assume that firms pay fees proportional to the expected financial gain which a rating
induces, and examine two settings. The contingent-fee setting is such that fees are only paid
if and when a firm obtains a favorable rating. These fees are proportional to the financial
gain resulting from a favorable rating. The upfront-fee setting is such that fees are paid before
1See, e.g., US SEC (2012): 12.
2Andrew Cuomo, who served as Attorney General of New York during the financial crisis, was among the
first public figures to support this change of regulation.
3US Senate (2011): 304.
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ratings are assigned. These fees are thus proportional to the expected financial gain induced by
the rating process. In either setting, the agency’s choice of information acquisition is derived
by weighing the immediate gains from shirking and assigning a favorable rating against future
gains derived from a high reputation (obtained in turn through correct ratings).4 Compared
to fees paid upfront, contingent fees raise the immediate gains from assigning a favorable
rating. Moreover, this effect strengthens with the reputation of the agency (since increasing
the agency’s reputation pushes the fees upward). Hence, when the agency’s reputation is
initially high, upfront fees induce more information acquisition than contingent fees.5
On the other hand, when the agency’s reputation is initially low then reputational incen-
tives can induce the strategic agency to acquire more information under contingent fees than
under upfront fees. The logic is the following. The more reputable the agency, the lower the
chances that a firm will obtain a favorable rating from the agency. So fees paid upfront are
in part pressed downward by an increase in the agency’s reputation. This, in turn, implies
that, from the viewpoint of the agency, incentives to build up reputation are weaker in the
upfront-fee setting than in the contingent-fee setting. We show in our main theorem that these
reputational incentives can be sufficient to assure more information acquisition and higher so-
cial welfare when fees are contingent than when they are upfront. This result suggests that
replacing contingent fees with upfront fees could be socially damaging in markets where all
CRAs have become suspect, as is perhaps the case today. The same would be true of markets
with many new CRAs having to build up their reputations.6
In the second part of the paper we extend our model so as to explore the strategic agency’s
choice of fee structure. We allow the agency to make each period a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the firm it proposes to rate. We assume –in line with current practice in the industry– that
the fee offered by the agency is unobserved by investors. First, contingent fees arise as an
equilibrium outcome irrespective of the agency’s reputation. This prediction matches the way
the market for credit rating actually works. Second, in any equilibrium, the agency’s take-
it-or-leave-it offers induce the same amount of information acquisition as the contingent-fee
structure examined in the first part our paper, irrespective of whether or not contingent-
fees are socially optimal. Our findings thus suggest that regulatory intervention might be
necessary.
4In the model we assume that the cost of information is sufficiently small that acquiring information is
socially optimal. So more information acquisition implies higher social welfare.
5This is the adverse selection effect we mentioned in the first paragraph of this introduction.
6We thank an anonymous referee for these observations.
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Our analysis and results have two main policy implications. We confirm first of all that if
a regulator monitors information acquisition and sanctions shirking (thus eliminating moral
hazard) then upfront fees are (a) socially optimal and (b) superior to contingent fees. The
second half of our paper suggests an alternative policy: the regulator could leave information
acquisition unchecked, but provide a way for CRAs to publicly commit to the fees they charge.
This would solve the main friction currently causing CRAs to choose inefficient fees, namely
the unobservability of CRAs’ fee structure. As long as investors have sufficient knowledge of
CRAs’ strategic incentives, observable fees make it optimal for CRAs to choose an efficient
fee structure. Lastly, note that while the focus of our paper is on the credit rating industry,
our analysis applies more generally to any market comprising seller-paid ratings; markets with
eco-labels for instance are prominent examples.
The paper is structured as follows. The related literature is discussed below. The model
is presented in Section 2. An overview of the main result is given in Section 3, in a simplified
two-period setting. The core analysis is in Section 4. Section 5 extends our baseline model by
endogenizing the agency’s fee structure. We discuss in Section 6 the limitations of our model.
Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the literature on credit rating by analyzing
the link between different compensation schemes and a rating agency’s incentives to acquire
costly information. Specifically, we identify the conditions under which fees paid upfront by the
issuer of a security generate less shirking than fees paid only in case of a favorable rating. Our
paper builds on the work of Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) showing that when fees are
contingent then reputational concerns are typically insufficient to discipline rating agencies.
The effects of reputational concerns in the credit rating industry are further analyzed in five
recent papers: Fulghieri, Strobl and Xia (2014), Frenkel (2015), Kashyap and Kovrijnykh
(2016), Bouvard and Levy (2018) and Kovbasyuk (2018). Fulghieri et al. (2014) analyze the
effect of introducing unsolicited credit ratings on CRAs’ behavior in a model with contingent
fees. The authors show that the adoption of unsolicited ratings raises CRAs’ profits, and can
lead to more informative ratings, thereby improving social welfare. Both Frenkel (2015) and
Bouvard and Levy (2018) examine a rating agency paid upfront by the rated firms. In Frenkel
(2015), the CRA has an incentive to maintain a reputation for credibility among investors
but also an incentive to develop a second reputation for leniency among issuers. The author
shows that in markets with few issuers, these incentives may lead the CRA to inflate ratings
as a strategic tool to form a “double reputation”. In the setting of Bouvard and Levy (2018),
3
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707069 
the agency chooses how much information to acquire. The firms’ projects are heterogeneous
in quality and so a reputation for providing accurate ratings attracts high-quality firms but
repels low-quality firms. The agency thus aims for a balanced reputation. The fee structure
of CRAs is endogenized in both Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2016) and Kovbasyuk (2018). In
Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2016) the focus is on who should pay for the ratings. The authors
find that rating errors tend to be larger in the issuer-pays models than in the investor-pays
model. Kovbasyuk (2018) analyzes the merits of forcing CRAs to publish the fees charged to
rated firms and shows that whereas private payments lead to coarse ratings, public payments
on the other hand induce precise ratings at the top of the rating scale.
Our paper is related at a broader level to the vast literature on rating agencies recently
surveyed in Jeon and Lovo (2013) and Sangiorgi and Spatt (2017), and particularly to two
strand of papers, those studying information acquisition in the credit rating industry and
those exploring rating inflation. Both Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2016) and Bouvard and Levy
(2018) belong to the first strand of research, which also includes Opp, Opp and Harris (2013)
and Bongaerts (2014), though the focus of the latter papers bears little relation to what we
do.7 The strand of research exploring rating inflation includes Skreta and Veldkamp (2009)
on the connection between asset complexity and rating inflation, Sangiorgi and Spatt (2016)
examining the implications of opacity about contacts between issuers and rating agencies,
and Goldstein and Huang (2017) on the link between rating inflation and firms’ investments.
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) note for instance that upfront fees eliminate the incentives
for CRAs to inflate ratings, but do not eliminate shopping.
Finally, we are connected more generally to the literature exploring the regulation of
markets for financial advice surveyed in Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), and to the work of
Chade and Kovrijnykh (2016) exploring optimal contracts for delegated information acqui-
sition. However, since we aim to capture frictions that are specific to the market for credit
ratings, the settings of those papers differ in many ways from ours.
2 A Model of Credit Rating with Contingent Fees
We examine a CRA rating a sequence of short-lived firms indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. Each firm
seeks to persuade investors to finance a project with uncertain (net) return qt ∈ {−1, 1}. The
7Opp et al. (2013) examine the impact of rating-contingent regulations. Bongaerts (2014) sheds light on
the relative merits of the investor-pays vs issuer-pays models of the rating industry by investigating which
alternative generates more shirking.
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sequence {qt} is independent and identically distributed according to P(qt = 1) = 12 .
8 Firms
which obtain a favorable rating pay to the agency a fee proportional to investors’ perceived
increase in their project’s expected return. Incurring a cost enables the agency to learn a
project’s return, but information acquisition is unobservable. The agency is either committed
to acquire information in all periods, or behaves strategically so as to maximize its expected
intertemporal profit. The details of the model are laid out below. We shall at times refer to
this model as the contingent-fee setting (the upfront-fee setting will be presented in Section
4).
Ratings and Information Acquisition. Each period the agency assigns a rating rt ∈
{−1, 1} (potentially) informing firms and investors about qt. Incurring a cost c ∈ (0, 12) at
the beginning of period t enables the agency to observe qt (noisy signals of project quality
are considered in Online Appendix A). Assuming c < 1
2
ensures that acquiring information
is socially optimal. The choice of the agency is between (a) acquiring information to assign
rt = qt and (b) automatically assigning rt = 1 without acquiring information in the first
place.9 Information acquisition is unobservable and therefore non-contractible.
Reputation. The agency is of one of two types: committed or strategic. The agency’s type
is private information, and determined by nature once and for all at the onset of the game.
Each period the committed agency acquires information and assigns rt = qt. The strategic
agency on the other hand chooses between acquiring information and shirking with a view to
maximize profits over the infinite horizon. Let ρt denote firms and investors’ beginning-of-
period-t belief that the agency is committed. We assume ρ1 ∈ (0, 1) and refer to ρt as the
agency’s reputation in period t.
Firms and Investors. At the beginning of each period firms and investors form beliefs
regarding the probability that the strategic agency will acquire information in the current
period; let êt denote the probability attached to the strategic agency acquiring information in
period t.
If the agency announces rt = −1 then firm t’s project is instantly dropped. On the other
hand, by Bayes’ rule, the rating rt = 1 raises firms and investors’ perceived expected return
8We abuse notation slightly and use qt to denote both the random variable and its realization.
9That the agency (when it acquires information) truthfully reports what it observes is without loss of
generality, as shirking always dominates acquiring information followed by misreporting qt. The case in which
the agency possibly deflates ratings when shirking is considered in Online Appendix B.
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from 0 to
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] =
1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
1 + (1− ρt)(1− êt)
. (1)
Investors are assumed to be on the long side of the market, so that if rt = 1, the project of
firm t is sold to them at the price E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] ≥ 0.
Fees. The agency obtains a fraction β of all proceeds resulting from selling projects to
investors. For now β is exogenous and can be interpreted as the bargaining power of the
agency (Section 5 endogenizes the fee structure). The agency’s fee φt(rt), which depends on
the rating assigned, is thus given by10
φt(rt) =
βE[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] if rt = 1;0 if rt = −1. (2)
If β < 2c then, in the upfront-fee setting presented in Section 4, the strategic agency always
shirks. To make the analysis interesting we thus assume β > 2c.
Timing. The timing within a period is as follows (see Figure 1). The agency first decides
whether or not to acquire information. Based on information gathered (if any), the agency
publicly announces rt, and receives the fee φt(rt). All players observe qt and the game moves











Strategies and Payoffs. The period-t profit of the agency is πt := φt(rt)−c1{info. acq. in period t},
where 1X denotes the indicator function of X. The payoff of firm t is 1{rt=1}E[qt|rt =
1, ρt, êt, ]−φt(rt). Finally, investors’ payoff in period t is given by 1{rt=1}
(
qt−E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt]
)
.
10All our results carry through more generally as long as the fee is some increasing function of all proceeds
resulting from selling projects to investors. See Online Appendix C.
11Whether or not qt is observed when rt = −1 is irrelevant, since rt = −1 implies qt = −1. Assuming that
qt is always observed at the end of a period enables us to economize on notation.
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t−1πt as the agency’s intertemporal profit. Social welfare, W , is defined as the






qt1{rt=1} − c1{information acquired in period t}
)
.
As c < 1
2
, acquiring information each period maximizes expected social welfare.
Equilibrium. A strategy of the agency specifies a probability of acquiring information as
a function of the history.13 We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which the strategic
agency uses a stationary Markov strategy with reputation as the state variable. Let
ρ+t :=
ρt
ρt + (1− ρt)êt
.
The following definition is adapted from Mathis et al. (2009):
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a mapping e : [0, 1] → [0, 1] specifying the probability e(ρt)
that the strategic agency acquires information given reputation ρt, such that, for all ρ1:
(i) the strategy e(·) maximizes the agency’s expected intertemporal profit given ρt+1 = Ψ(ρt, rt, qt),
where
Ψ(ρt, rt, qt) :=

ρt if qt = 1;
ρ+t if qt = −1 = rt and ρt > 0;
0 if qt = −1 = −rt, or ρt = 0.
(ii) firms and investors’ beliefs satisfy êt = e(ρt).
In equilibrium investors correctly infer the probability with which the strategic agency
chooses to acquire information, and the agency’s choice of information acquisition is optimal
given the evolution of beliefs captured by Ψ. The beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. In particular, if qt = 1 then rt = 1 whether the agency shirks or acquires
12We rule out δ = 2β+4c3β+2c for expositional simplicity. In this case, multiple equilibria exist which only differ
off equilibrium path.
13The structure of the model enables us to focus on the single-agent decision problem facing the agency.
Specifically, we simplified the exposition by leaving a number of “actions” outside of the model: we assumed
that (a) conditional on rt = 1, firm t sells the project to investors at the price E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt], and (b) the
division of surplus between the firms and the agency is determined by the exogenous parameter β.
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information, hence reputation does not change. If qt = −1, two cases arise: rt = 1 reveals that
the agency has shirked (and thus, that the agency is strategic), and rt = −1 reveals that the
agency has acquired information. In the latter case reputation (weakly) increases since the
committed agency acquires information with probability 1. Zero-probability events are dealt
with by assuring that ρt = 0 is an absorbing state of the Markov process and by ascribing any
misreporting to the strategic agency (that is, whether or not the initial probability that the
agency is strategic is positive).
3 Overview of the Main Result
In this section we briefly analyze a two-period version of the model in order to develop intuition
for the paper’s main result.
We solve this game by backward induction. With two periods only, the strategic agency
shirks at t = 2. Then ê2 = 0 and, by (1) and (2), the agency’s period-2 profit is




Consider now the agency’s problem at t = 1. If it shirks (and automatically assigns r1 = 1)
























where, recall, ρ+1 =
ρ1
ρ1+(1−ρ1)ê1 denotes the Bayes-updated belief that the agency is committed
after observing that q1 = −1 = r1. Shirking is thus optimal if and only if
1
2









14To understand (3) note that with probability 12 , q1 = 1 in which case nothing is learned about the type
of the agency between periods 1 and 2 (ρ2 = ρ1), while with probability
1
2 , q1 = −1 in which case firms and
investors observe that the agency shirked, and thus learn that the agency is strategic (ρ2 = 0).
15In this case the agency receives the fee φ1(1) with probability
1
2 only, since if qt = −1 the agency announces
rt = −1 and receives φ1(−1) = 0.
8
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The left-hand side represents the short-run incentive to shirk : 1
2
φ1(1) captures the gain from
securing a positive fee irrespective of period-1 project’s return, and c the saving from not
paying the cost of information. The right-hand side represents the long-run incentive to
acquire information, and captures the gain from obtaining a larger fee at t = 2 due to a higher
reputation.
In particular, an equilibrium in which the strategic agency shirks with probability 1 at t = 1
exists if and only if (3) holds for ê1 = 0. Noting that ê1 = 0 implies ρ
+
1 = 1, straightforward







We next carry out similar calculations, but in a setting in which fees are paid upfront
rather than depending on the rating assigned. We first note that, prior to knowing the rating
assigned, firm t’s “expected value of the rating rt” is P(rt = 1|ρt, êt)E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] (this is
firm t’s expected revenue from investors). So with fees paid upfront the fees received by the
agency are
φt(1) = φt(−1) = βP(rt = 1|ρt, êt)E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt], (4)
instead of (2). Then the agency (which still chooses to shirk at t = 2) obtains the period-2
profit




Consider now the agency’s problem at t = 1 in the upfront-fee setting. If it shirks the





























1 )− πu2 (0)
)
, (5)
and an equilibrium in which the strategic agency shirks with probability 1 exists if and only
9
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Now notice that if ρ1 is sufficiently small (ρ1 <
4c
β+2c
) β, c and δ can be chosen such that
(??) holds while (?) is violated. This shows that under certain conditions the strategic agency
acquires information (with some positive probability) when fees are contingent but shirks when
fees are paid upfront.16
To gain intuition for this finding, consider the marginal benefit from building a reputation
in the contingent-fee setting (
dπc2
dρ2


































, ∀ê1 ∈ [0, 1].
The reason is that with upfront fees the agency is paid at t = 2 proportionately to firm 2’s
belief that it will obtain a favorable rating (that is, proportionately to P(r2 = 1|ρ2, 0)). Yet,
firm 2 expects a reputable agency to act truthfully, and thus to deliver negative ratings with
high probability:
P(r2 = 1|ρ2, 0) =
1
2
· ρ2 + 1 · (1− ρ2)
is decreasing in ρ2. So, in an upfront-fee setting, building a reputation is only moderately
rewarding for the agency. By contrast, firm 2’s belief that it will obtain a favorable rating
plays no role under contingent fees, as the firm only pays the agency conditional on r2 = 1.
As we will see in the next section, the previous findings do not rest on the two-period
nature of the simple model examined here. We further show in the online appendices that
these findings are robust to various modifications of the baseline model: we show in Online
Appendix A that they still hold if the agency observes noisy signals of project quality; Online
Appendix B checks the robustness of our analysis by allowing the strategic agency to announce
rt = −1 whether or not in period t the agency chooses to acquire information; in Online
16This remark implicitly assumes that an equilibrium exists in the contingent-fee setting for the parameters
we are considering. The existence of an equilibrium is easy to prove.
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Appendix C we show that the main results carry through if instead of being paid a fixed
fraction β of all proceeds from selling the projects to investors, the agency is paid an arbitrary
increasing function of these proceeds; Online Appendix D allows the prior probability of qt = 1
to take any value in (0, 1); finally, Online Appendix E shows that our main results continue
to hold in a setting in which qt is never observed by firms and investors.
4 Main Analysis
We characterize in Subsection 4.1 the unique equilibrium of the contingent-fee setting pre-
sented in Section 2. The upfront-fee setting is presented and examined in Subsection 4.2. Our
first main result (Theorem 1) is stated and discussed in Subsection 4.3.
4.1 Contingent Fees




























where ϕc(ρt) := βE[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)] denotes the fee paid to the agency in case rt = 1 as a
function of the agency’s reputation ρt. As the maximand is linear in the control variable, the
























We show in the appendix that Vc(0) = 0. Hence, if
ϕc(ρ)
2
+ c = δ
2
Vc(ρ
+) the strategic agency
is indifferent between shirking and acquiring information; if ϕc(ρ)
2




uniquely optimal; and if ϕc(ρ)
2
+ c < δ
2
Vc(ρ
+) then acquiring information is uniquely optimal.
In the terminology of Section 3, ϕc(ρ)
2




+) represents the long run incentive to acquire information.
The following proposition establishes that an equilibrium exists, is unique, and exhibits
a familiar pattern (Benabou and Laroque (1992), Mathis et al. (2009), Board and Meyer-
ter Vehn (2013)): the strategic agency builds up reputation when it is low, and milks its
reputation when it is high.
11











e(ρ) = 0 e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) e(ρ) = 1
ρ ρ
Figure 2: equilibrium with contingent fees
Proposition 1. An equilibrium of the contingent-fee setting exists and is unique. In equilib-
rium, e(0) = 0; for ρ > 0 the equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs ρ and ρ, ρ ≤ ρ, such
that 
if ρ ∈ [ρ, 1] then e(ρ) = 0,
if ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ) then e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1),
if ρ ∈ (0, ρ] then e(ρ) = 1.
Moreover, in equilibrium, the fee φt(1) paid to the agency in the case of a favorable rating is
a non-decreasing function of the agency’s reputation ρt.
The proof of the proposition is in Appendix A. A description of the strategic agency’s
equilibrium behavior for different values of δ is given in Figure 2 (the details of all calculations
are in Appendix A). For δ > 2β+4c
3β+2c
we obtain ρ = 1, that is, the strategic agency acquires
information with probability 1 as long as its reputation is not zero. For δ < 2c
β+c
we obtain
ρ = 0, that is, the strategic agency shirks with probability 1 irrespective of its reputation.




) we obtain ρ = 0 < ρ < 1, that is, the strategic agency shirks above a
certain level of reputation, and randomizes between shirking and acquiring information below
this reputation.
12







e(ρ) = 0 e(ρ) = 1
4c
β+2c
Figure 3: equilibrium with upfront fees
4.2 Upfront Fees
In this subsection we present and analyze the upfront-fee setting. This setting replicates all
features of the contingent-fee setting (see Section 2) except for the fact that since a firm’s
expected revenue from investors at the time of paying the fee is now P(rt = 1|ρt, êt)E[qt|rt =
1, ρt, êt], then (2) is accordingly replaced by (4).
We proceed to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the strategic agency in this setting.
In equilibrium the agency is paid ϕu(ρt) := βP(rt = 1|ρt, e(ρt))E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)] in period

























+) the strategic agency is
indifferent between shirking and acquiring information; if c > δ
2
Vu(ρ
+) shirking is uniquely
optimal; and if c < δ
2
Vu(ρ
+) acquiring information is then uniquely optimal. In other words, in
this setting c represents the short-run incentive to shirk, while δ
2
Vu(ρ
+) represents the long-run
incentive to acquire information.
The following proposition establishes that an equilibrium exists and is unique.


























noting that the maximand is linear in the control variable.
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Proposition 2. If δ < 4c
β+2c
then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium with
upfront fees. If δ > 4c
β+2c
the unique equilibrium is
e(ρ) =
1 if ρ > 0;0 if ρ = 0.
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition. Its proof is in Appendix B. The familiar pattern of
Proposition 1 is here replaced by a different one: either the strategic agency shirks irrespective
of its reputation, or the strategic agency acquires information with probability 1 at all positive
values of reputation. The difference between these patterns can be traced back to the relation
between reputation and the short-run incentive to shirk in the two settings. With contingent
fees, the short-run incentive to shirk is an increasing function of reputation. By contrast, with
upfront fees the short-run incentive to shirk is independent of reputation.
4.3 Main Result







), the combination of Propositions 1 and 2 yields the following theorem.




) then, for ρ1 ∈ (0, ρ̃), contingent





upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees. In all other cases,
expected social welfare is the same whether fees are upfront or contingent.
The first part of the theorem is our first main result: contingent fees can improve expected
social welfare relative to upfront fees. The basic mechanism is as indicated in Section 3 for the
two-period case, namely, contingent fees result in more information acquisition than upfront
fees by inducing stronger long-run incentives to acquire information. To illustrate here this
point in a simple way, it is useful to compare the long-run incentives to acquire information
(that is, δ
2
Vi(·), for i = c, u) for the parametric region δ < 2cβ+c in which, under either fee





, for i = c, u. (7)
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We thus obtain first
Vu(ρt) =
P(rt = 1|ρt, 0)ϕc(ρt)
1− δ
2








The agency’s costly and unobservable information acquisition is the key friction underlying
Theorem 1. To bring home this important point, recall that with upfront fees the short-run
incentive to shirk is c only, hence, in the upfront-fee setting, for c = 0 the strategic agency
acquires information with probability 1 each period.18 Yet, by rewarding the agency for giving
out favorable ratings, contingent fees incentivize rating inflation, irrespective of the cost of
information.19 In the absence of moral hazard upfront fees are thus socially optimal and
provide unambiguously better incentives than contingent fees.
5 Endogenous Fees
We assumed up to this point that the fee structure of the rating agency was exogenously
given. In this section we endogenize the fee structure and show that endogenous fees arise as
an equilibrium outcome irrespective of the agency’s reputation. While other fee structures may
be possible, any of them induces the same amount of information acquisition as contingent
fees (whether or not contingent fees are socially efficient). The key friction underlying this
inefficiency is the non-observability by investors of the contracts offered by the agency.
We show first that (socially optimal) fee structures exist that induce the strategic agency
to acquire information with probability 1 each period. To see this, consider the following
family of fee structures: if ρt = 0 then φt(1) = φt(−1) = 0, while if ρt = ρ1 then φt(1) = a and









a+ b ≤ 1.
18Note that the threshold in Proposition 2, 4cβ+2c , is equal to 0 for c = 0.
19Note that limδ→0 ρ = 0 for all values of c (see the proof of Proposition 1).
20See Online Appendix G.
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The first highlighted inequality captures the strategic agency’s incentive compatibility con-
straint; the second captures the firms’ participation constraint. As c < 1
2
, a solution always
exists: just choose a = 0 to obtain 2c ≤ b ≤ 1.21 Moreover, as δ
2−δ is increasing in δ, raising δ
relaxes the first constraint without affecting the second. The set of solutions therefore expands
as δ increases. Note that upfront fees (corresponding to a = b) are socially optimal if δ > 4c
1+2c
;




We next inquire: should we expect CRAs to choose a socially optimal fee structure (induc-
ing et = 1 each period), or might regulatory intervention be needed? To address this question,





the firm in period t, specifying payments φt(rt) as a function of rt.
22 In line with the fact that
rating agencies do not publish the fees that they charge their clients (see Kovbasyuk (2018)
for a discussion of the pros and cons of transparent fees), we assume moreover that only firm
t can observe the agency’s offer;23 we discuss later the importance of this feature.





. If the firm rejects, the game moves on to the next period (we let rt = ∅
denote the situation in which the agency’s offer is rejected); if it accepts, the agency then
decides whether or not to acquire information. Based on information gathered (if any), the
agency publicly announces rt, and receives φt(rt). All players observe qt and the game moves


















Figure 4: Timeline with endogenous fees
21Intuitively, the rating rt = −1 maximizes the likelihood that the agency acquired information. So reward-
ing the agency exclusively at rt = −1 optimally incentivizes information acquisition.
22As noted by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) “ESMA is concerned that CRAs
with significant market power could exploit their market power and margins, which gives them large space for
fee flexibility. Costs are not currently the key pricing factor for these CRAs, which ultimately might result
in price discrimination. [...] The fees charged to clients appear an estimation of the value for the individual
client rather than being linked to the cost of production”.
23The largest credit rating agencies provide broad guidelines concerning their rating fees (see, e.g.
Standard & Poor’s Guidelines For Fees.), however fees actually paid by firms are not disclosed.
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A stationary strategy of the agency is a triple
(
(φ(1, ·), φ(−1, ·)), e(·)
)
, where (φ(1, ·), φ(−1, ·)) :
[0, 1] → R2+ and e : [0, 1] → [0, 1] specifying, respectively, the agency’s offer and the proba-
bility of acquiring information as functions of the agency’s reputation ρt. A firms’ stationary
strategy is a mapping d : R2 × [0, 1]→ {accept, reject} specifying which offers to accept as a
function of the agency’s reputation ρt.
We focus on equilibria such that, each period, the committed agency makes an offer which
the firm accepts, but make no other assumptions concerning offers made by the committed
type.24 The next definition adapts the equilibrium concept used previously; we refer to the
model described here as the endogenous-fee setting.
Definition 2. An equilibrium with endogenous fees is a tuple
(
(φ(1, ·), φ(−1, ·)), e(·), d(·)
)
such that, for all ρ1:
(i) in period t, the strategic agency makes the offer (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt));
(ii) the strategic agency acquires information with probability e(ρt), and investors’ beliefs
satisfy
êt = e(ρt);
(iii) each firm’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule whenever possible and d((φt(1), φt(−1)), ρt) =




, firm t expects a non-negative payoff
from accepting the offer;
(iv) the strategy
(
(φ(1, ·), φ(−1, ·)), e(·)
)
maximizes the agency’s expected intertemporal profit
given the firms’ decision rule and ρt+1 = Ψ(ρt, rt, qt), where
Ψ(ρt, rt, qt) :=

ρt if qt = 1 = rt;
ρ+t if qt = −1 = rt and ρt > 0;
0 if qt = −1 = −rt, or ρt = 0, or rt = ∅.
(v) each period t the committed agency makes an offer that is accepted by the firm in period
t.
24Exactly what offers the committed agency makes is irrelevant for this section’s main result; the committed
agency could make any offer (φt(1), φt(−1)) satisfying
1
2
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could differ from investors’ beliefs in period t. In equilibrium
investors attach probability ρt to the agency being committed and probability e(ρt) to the





firm t’s beliefs concerning both the type of the agency, and the probability with which the
strategic agency chooses to acquire information.25 The central remark is that, conditional on
rt = 1, firm t’s project is sold to investors at the price E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)] irrespective of the
agency’s underlying offer to the firm. Hence, in equilibrium the offer
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
(i.e. the contingent fee of Section 2 with β = 1) is acceptable irrespective of firm t’s beliefs
concerning the agency’s type and of firm t’s beliefs about the probability with which the
strategic agency chooses to acquire information.
In fact, we show in the proof of the next theorem that the offer
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
is
optimal for the agency in any equilibrium and that, in consequence, equilibrium offers induce
the same amount of information acquisition as the contingent-fee structure of Section 2.
Theorem 2. Let e∗(·) denote the equilibrium with contingent fees and β = 1 described in
Proposition 1. In every equilibrium with endogenous fees, e(·) = e∗(·). Moreover, an equi-
librium with endogenous fees exists in which, for all ρt, the strategic agency makes the offer(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
.
As information acquisition is here as in the contingent-fee setting of Section 2, social welfare
is as in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Combining Proposition 1 and Theorem
2 thus establishes that the condition δ > 2+4c
3+2c
is both necessary and sufficient for the fee
structure chosen by the strategic agency to be socially optimal. Why might the agency choose
a sub-optimal fee structure? The key friction of this section’s model is the non-observability




to the firm in period t. If offers could be
observed, then any socially optimal fee structure could be enforced by an equilibrium with
endogenous fees. However, unobservable offers enable the strategic agency to (a) propose to
the firm in period t a contingent fee structure rewarding it at rt = 1, (b) shirk, and (c) obtain
the maximal fee consistent with firm t’s participation constraint. In this case, a contingent fee










that the agency is strategic.
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6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the policy implications of our results for the credit rating industry
and the role of our main modeling assumptions.
Policy Implications. We remarked in Section 4 that moral hazard is the key friction making
upfront fees potentially inefficient. A regulator can make information acquisition observable
by directly monitoring CRAs’ research activities. The resulting setting is analyzed in Online
Appendix F. We show that in the absence of moral hazard the strategic agency always assigns
correct ratings if fees are paid upfront, but not when fees are contingent. Upfront fees thus
perhaps deserve the attention they received in the public debate: they are socially optimal
provided the information acquisition process is supervised.
However, the analysis in Section 5 suggests alternative policy options. The regulator
could leave information acquisition unsupervised, while making sure that the agency adopts
a socially optimal fee structure. The regulator could directly impose a socially efficient fee
structure, or else offer CRAs a way to publicly commit to whichever fee structure they prefer.
Commitment could for example be achieved by supervising the transactions between agencies
and rated firms.
All these policy options have advantages and shortcomings. Monitoring CRAs’ research
activities might be expensive, but offers the advantage that upfront fees ensure efficiency even
if investors and the regulator are not fully aware of the agency’s incentives.26 By contrast,
the policy options that focus on the fee structure alone might be cheaper to implement, but
require regulator and investors to have a correct notion of the CRA’s incentives.27
Time Discounting. A discussion of time discounting is in order. To keep the model simple,
we defined a period as the time elapsed between two ratings as well as the time it takes for the
quality of a project to become public knowledge. This is a stark simplification, as in reality
the two intervals have very different lengths. In markets for credit ratings the time between
two ratings is extremely short, in the order of minutes.28 Public information about rated
26This policy ensures efficiency even if investors are uncertain about the value of c and δ. Furthermore, the
regulator does not need to know the value of these parameters to implement upfront fees.
27As shown in Section 5, whether a fee structure is efficient or not depends on c and δ. On the one hand,
regulating the fee structure while ignoring the value of these parameters might result in socially inefficient
fee structures. On the other hand, letting the agency commit publicly to a fee structure, might result in the
agency choosing a socially inefficient fee if investors are uncertain about c and δ.
28See evidence from White (2010), Table 1. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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securities, on the contrary, takes far longer to reach the market. However, our results remain
valid regardless of one’s interpretation of the length of a period. If one interprets a period as
a short time interval then our results are still valid as we show in Online Appendix E that
they hold in a model in which firms and investors do not learn a project’s quality before the
next rating is assigned. Else one could interpret a period as a long time interval (say, a year)
and interpret the revenues for a single rating as a proxy for the revenues from all the ratings
assigned during that time interval.
If one interprets a period as a short time interval, then δ must be close to 1. One might in
this case worry about the relevance of the results discussed in Section 4 since, for δ sufficiently
close to 1, Propositions 1 and 2 together show that the strategic agency acquires information
with probability 1 regardless of the fee structure. Yet, this result hinges on the purely ex-
positional choice to restrict attention to c < β
2





), in which case upfront fees result in shirking for any δ < 1, while for δ sufficiently
large (and ρ not too large), contingent fees improve expected social welfare relative to upfront
fees.
The choice to model a period both as the time elapsed between two ratings as well as the
time it takes for the quality of a project to become public knowledge implies that in our model
investors and firm learn about the agency’s type by comparing ratings and project qualities.
In reality, ratings assigned are likely to affect a CRA’s reputation even when no information
about the rated securities is learned. While our simplification implies that our model does
not capture the full dynamics of a CRA’s reputation, we show in Online Appendix E that our
main results continue to hold even if qt is never revealed to firms and investors.
Rating-Based Regulation. In our model ratings have a purely informative role. In real-
ity, credit ratings have a regulatory role, namely certain types of institutional investors can
only buy assets with investment-level ratings, thus making a rating valuable regardless of
its informational content. While adding rating-based regulation to our model is beyond the
scope of this paper, we contend that our main result would still hold to the extent that the
ratings have some informative content. Our analysis has no bite in markets where ratings are
purchased purely in order to access a larger set of investors.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examined information acquisition by a credit rating agency with reputational
concerns. Each period, the agency chooses whether or not to acquire costly information. The
agency is either committed to acquire information, or behaves strategically with the objective
of maximizing intertemporal profits. We first compare two compensation schemes. In one
setting the agency receives a fee only if it assigns a favorable rating. This setting corresponds
to the way rating agencies are currently compensated. In the other setting, the agency receives
a fee irrespective of the rating assigned. Whereas fees paid upfront are socially optimal when
information acquisition is publicly observable (or costless), moral hazard can lead contingent
fees to induce higher social welfare than upfront fees. With endogenous fees, the contracts
offered by the agency to the rated firms induce the agency to acquire information as if the fees
were contingent. Our results contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the optimal way to
compensate credit rating agencies. Specifically, our findings suggest that replacing contingent
fees with upfront fees could be socially damaging in markets where all CRAs have become
suspect, and in markets with many new CRAs having to build up their reputations.
The model could be extended in several directions. For example, the literature on com-
petition among rating agencies shows how specific features of the market for credit ratings
determine whether competition is feasible and desirable: along these lines, it would be inter-
esting to evaluate the effect of the entry of new rating agencies under different compensation
schemes.29 Alternatively, the analysis could be extended to study how different compensation
schemes fare in markets in which each firm hires a rating agency multiple times.30
29Previous work on the effect of market structure on the quality of ratings includes Strausz (2005), Faure-
Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2009), Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012), Doherty, Kartasheva and Phillips
(2012), Bouvard and Levy (2018), Hirth (2014), and Bizzotto (2014).
30As in Frenkel (2015), for example.
21
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707069 
Appendix A
Define Φ(·, ·) : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R by
Φ(ρ, e) :=
1− (1− ρ)(1− e)
1 + (1− ρ)(1− e)
.
Notice that E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] = Φ(ρt, êt), and that Φ(·, ·) is continuous, weakly increasing in
both variables, Φ(ρ, e) > 0 unless ρ = e = 0, and Φ(1, e) = Φ(ρ, 1) = 1 for all e and ρ in [0, 1].
Given a function e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ+ :=
0 if ρ = 0,ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) if ρ > 0.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0, where V (·) denotes the equilibrium
value function. For all ρ > 0,if δ2V (ρ+) >
β
2
Φ(ρ, e(ρ)) + c then e(ρ) = 1,
if δ
2
V (ρ+) < β
2
Φ(ρ, e(ρ)) + c then e(ρ) = 0.
Proof: By virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,31






















for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the agency’s choice implied by e(ρ) maximizes the right-hand side of the
expression above. That is:
31Consider a state space X, a control space U , a law of motion a such that xt+1 ∼ a(xt, ut), and a bounded
reward function r : X × U → R. Let π : X → U denote an arbitrary (stationary) policy, and define







Bellman’s Principle of Optimality states that
V (x) = sup
u0
[
r(x0, u0) + δE[V (x1)|x0 = x, u0]
]
and that π is an optimal policy if and only if π(x) maximizes the right-hand side of the expression above, for
all x ∈ X.
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e(ρ) = 1 if
β
2

















e(ρ) = 0 if β
2

















We are only left to show that e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0. That e(0) = 0 follows from the above,
noting that ρ+ = 0 if ρ = 0. Then V (0) = βΦ(0, 0) + δV (0) = δV (0). Hence V (0) = 0.

Lemma 2. In any equilibrium,





























≥ V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The lemma follows from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality together with the obser-
vations that (a) e(ρ) = 1 implies ρ+ = ρ, (b) ρ = 1 implies ρ+ = 1, (c) Φ(1, e) = 1 for all
e ∈ [0, 1], and (d) Φ(·, ·) is weakly increasing in both variables.





1 if ρ > 0,0 if ρ = 0, (9)
is an equilibrium. If δ < δ, in any equilibrium: e(ρ) < 1 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: By Lemma 1, e(0) = 0 for all δ. Next, consider ρ > 0. If in equilibrium e(ρ) = 1 then
by Lemma 1 and the observation that ρ+ = ρ:
δ
2
V (ρ) ≥ β
2
Φ(ρ, 1) + c.










Φ(ρ, 1) + c,
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or, equivalently, δ ≥ δ once we note that Φ(ρ, 1) = 1. The condition δ ≥ δ is thus necessary
for e(ρ) = 1. Sufficiency follows from the one-shot deviation principle.

Lemma 3. The following are equivalent:
δ ≥ δ, (10)
β
2

































Moreover, the equivalence between (10)-(12) continues to hold with strict inequalities instead
of weak inequalities.
Proof: Equivalence is easily checked using Φ(ρ, 1) = 1.

Proposition 4. If δ > δ then (9) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 1, e(0) = 0 in any equilibrium. So we are only left to show that, in any
equilibrium, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.
Suppose that an equilibrium exists such that e(ρ̂) < 1 for some ρ̂ > 0. Applying first
Lemma 1 then Lemma 2:
β
2
Φ(ρ̂, e(ρ̂)) + c ≥ δ
2








We thus obtain, using the equivalence between (10) and (12) (with strict inequalities), the











Φ(ρ̂, 1) + c ≥ β
2








from which we infer that e(ρ̂+) < 1. We can thus repeat the steps above with ρ̂+ instead of
ρ̂, and so on. This process determines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all n:
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By (i)-(ii), either e(ρn) → 1 or ρn → 1. Hence, taking limits in (iii) yields (using continuity
of Φ(·, ·) and the fact that Φ(1, e) = Φ(ρ, 1) = 1 for all e and ρ in [0, 1]):
β
2








The equivalence between (10) and (12) (with strict inequalities) establishes a contradiction
between (14) and δ > δ.

Proposition 5. If δ ≤ δ := 2c
β+c
then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium.
















whenever δ < δ. Combining (15), (16) and Lemma 2 now yields c > δ
2
V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Hence, by Lemma 1, e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
That e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium is immediate from (15), (16), and the
one-shot deviation principle.

Proposition 6. Let δ ∈ (δ, δ). There exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium,e(ρ) = 0 if ρ ∈ {0} ∪ [ρ̃, 1],e(ρ) ∈ (0, ẽ] if ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃), (17)
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where ρ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and ẽ ∈ (0, 1) are defined implicitly by
β
2






















Proof: Applying Lemma 3,
δ < δ ⇔ β
2


















Thus ρ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and ẽ ∈ (0, 1).
We now prove the rest of the proposition. We will first proceed by induction to show that
there can exist at most one equilibrium. We will then argue that the inductive procedure
yields an equilibrium. As a preliminary step, observe that by Lemma 2 and the equivalence






for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
The inductive procedure starts as follows. Combining (18) and (20), any equilibrium must
be such that, for all ρ > ρ̃ :
β
2




Thus, by Lemma 1, if an equilibrium exists it must satisfy e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ > ρ̃. A similar
argument shows that in fact the same must be true for ρ = ρ̃.
By contrast, consider ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃). The combination of (18), (20), and Lemma 1 shows that
e(ρ) = 0 is impossible in equilibrium. Similarly, the combination of (19), (20) and Lemma 1
shows that e(ρ) > ẽ is impossible in equilibrium. Thus, any equilibrium must satisfy (17). By
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Φ(ρ, e(ρ)) + c (21)
must hold for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃).
Next define ρ1 < ρ̃ such that
ρ̃ =
ρ1
ρ1 + (1− ρ1)ẽ
.
By construction of ρ1 and property (17), in any equilibrium: ρ
+ ≥ ρ̃ for all ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ̃).
(21), (17) and (20) now pin down a unique candidate equilibrium e(ρ) for each ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ̃).
Moreover, this candidate equilibrium is continuous in ρ and such that Φ(ρ, e(ρ)) is increasing
in ρ. Repeating the step above with ρ1 instead of ρ̃ yields ρ2 < ρ1 and a unique candidate
equilibrium e(ρ) for each ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1), and so on. This defines a sequence {ρn} where, for all
n, ρ̃n =
ρn+1
ρn+1+(1−ρn+1)ẽ . As ẽ < 1, ρn → 0. This inductive procedure therefore pins down a
unique candidate equilibrium. That this candidate equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium is a
consequence of the one-shot deviation principle.

Proof of Proposition 1: Follows from Propositions 3-6.

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Appendix B





1− (1− ρ)(1− e)
)
.
Notice that P(rt = 1|ρt, êt)E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] = Υ(ρt, êt), and that Υ(·, ·) is continuous, weakly
increasing in both variables, Υ(ρ, e) > 0 unless ρ = e = 0, and Υ(1, e) = Υ(ρ, 1) = 1
2
for all e
and ρ in [0, 1]. We also borrow the definition of ρ+ from Appendix A.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium, e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0, where V (·) denotes the equilibrium
value function. For all ρ > 0,if δ2V (ρ+) > c then e(ρ) = 1,if δ
2
V (ρ+) < c then e(ρ) = 0.
Proof: By virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,



















for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the choice implied by e(ρ) maximizes the right-hand side of (22). That


































We are only left to show that e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0. That e(0) = 0 follows from the above,
noting that ρ+ = 0 if ρ = 0. Substituting back into (22) then yields V (0) = βΦ(0, 0)+δV (0) =
δV (0). Hence V (0) = 0.

Lemma 5. In any equilibrium,
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≥ V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The lemma follows from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality together with the obser-
vations that (a) e(ρ) = 1 implies ρ+ = ρ, (b) ρ = 1 implies ρ+ = 1, (c) Υ(1, e) = 1
2
for all
e ∈ [0, 1], and (d) Υ(·, ·) is weakly increasing in both variables.





1 if ρ > 00 if ρ = 0 (23)
is an equilibrium. If δ < 4c
β+2c
, in any equilibrium: e(ρ) < 1 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: By Lemma 4, e(0) = 0 for all δ. Next, consider ρ > 0. If in equilibrium e(ρ) = 1 then
Lemma 4 and the observation that ρ+ = ρ yield
δ
2
V (ρ) ≥ c.








or, equivalently, δ ≥ 4c
β+2c
once we note that Υ(ρ, 1) = 1
2
. The condition δ ≥ 4c
β+2c
is thus
necessary for e(ρ) = 1. Sufficiency follows from the one-shot deviation principle.

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Moreover, the equivalence between (24)-(26) continues to hold with strict inequalities instead
of weak inequalities.




Proposition 8. If δ > 4c
β+2c
, then (23) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 4, e(0) = 0 in any equilibrium. So we are only left to show that, in any
equilibrium, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.





























from which we infer that e(ρ̂+) < 1. We can thus repeat the steps above with ρ̂+ instead of
ρ̂, and so on. This process determines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all n:












By (i)-(ii), either e(ρn) → 1 or ρn → 1. Hence, taking limits in (iii) yields (using continuity
of Υ(·, ·) and the fact that Υ(1, e) = Υ(ρ, 1) = 1
2
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Proposition 9. If δ < 4c
β+2c
then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 6, we have δ < 4c
β+2c
















Combining (29) and (30) gives c > δ
2
V (1); hence, by Lemma 5, c > δ
2
V (ρ) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 4 thus yields e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
That e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium is immediate from (29), (30), and the
one-shot deviation principle.

Proof of Proposition 2: Follows from Propositions 7-9.

Proof of Theorem 1: Proposition 1 characterizes the unique equilibrium with contingent
fees, and Proposition 2 characterizes the unique equilibrium with upfront fees. The cutoff
δ = 2β+4c
3β+2c
is taken from Proposition 3. The cutoff δ = 2c
β+c
is taken from Proposition 5.
With upfront fees, either the strategic agency shirks irrespective of ρt or the strategic agency
acquires information with probability 1 irrespective of ρt. Hence, all that remains to show is
that the expected period-t welfare is an increasing function of the probability with which the
strategic agency chooses to acquire information.
The expected period-t welfare is
P(rt = 1)E[qt|rt = 1]− c
(









)1− (1− ρt)(1− e(ρt))
1 + (1− ρt)(1− e(ρt))
− c
(







ρt + (1− ρt)e(ρt)
)
;
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Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 2: We start with the first part of the theorem, namely, we show that
e(·) = e∗(·) in any equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary equilibrium
(
(φ(1, ·), φ(−1, ·)), e(·), d(·)
)
,
denoted by E. We separate the analysis into three cases.
Case 1: in E, for all ρt, the offer of the committed type differs from (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)). In
E, the offer
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
is acceptable since no matter firm t’s beliefs the firm can












E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)],
otherwise offering
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
and acquiring information with probability e(ρt)
would be a strictly profitable deviation for the agency. On the other hand, in E, the offer


















E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)] is firm t’s expected revenue from investors following the
offer (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)) (the offer of the committed type differs from (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)), so
firm t assigns probability 1 to the strategic type upon observing (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt))). Com-













We now claim that E ′ ≡
((





with off-path beliefs as in equilibrium E wherever possible, or such that firm t assigns prob-
ability 1 to the agency being strategic and acquiring information with probability e(ρt)
in case
((
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
6= (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)) and the agency makes the offer
(φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)). Note first that, by (31), E and E ′ induce identical expected payoffs
on their respective equilibrium paths. Thus E and E ′ also induce identical continuation pay-
offs. That E ′ comprises an equilibrium now follows from the one-shot deviation principle.
However, if E ′ is an equilibrium then e(·) = e∗(·) by virtue of Proposition 1.
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Case 2: in E, for all ρt, both types of the agency offer (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)). In E, the offer(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
is acceptable. So φ(−1, ρt) = 0 trivially implies φ(1, ρt) = E[qt|rt =












E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], (32)
otherwise offering
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)], 0
)
and acquiring information with probability e(ρt)
would be a strictly profitable deviation for the agency. On the other hand, in E, the offer








E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)]
≥ ρt
(

































E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)]
]
.
By (32), the right-hand side in the previous inequality is non-negative, giving E[qt|rt =
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E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e(ρt)]. (33)
We now claim that E ′ ≡
((





with off-path beliefs as in equilibrium E. First, by (33), E and E ′ induce identical expected
payoffs on their respective equilibrium paths. Thus E and E ′ also induce identical continuation
payoffs. That E ′ comprises an equilibrium now follows from the one-shot deviation principle,
combined with the observation that in E ′ the offer (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)) of the committed type
is still acceptable (since we showed that e(ρt) = 1). However, if E
′ is an equilibrium then
e(·) = e∗(·) by virtue of Proposition 1.
Case 3: general case. The case in which for some values of ρt both types of the agency offer
(φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)), while the offer of the committed type differs from (φ(1, ρt), φ(−1, ρt)) for
other values of ρt is a straightforward extension of Cases 1 and 2 above.
We next show the second part of the theorem, that is, we show that an equilibrium with
endogenous fees exists in which the strategic agency makes offers
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
.
Let Vc(·) denote the value function of the agency in the unique equilibrium of Proposition
1 with β = 1. To fix ideas, assume that each period the committed type makes the offer(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
(other cases are similar). Moreover, suppose that investors’ beliefs
satisfy êt = e
∗(ρt) (we are not claiming at this stage that these beliefs are consistent). For
each offer ω 6=
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
accepted in period t let ẽ(ω, ρt) denote an optimal
information acquisition strategy of the agency given the continuation payoffs Vc(·) (accepting
ω need not be optimal for firm t). Let d
((




= accept and, for all
ω 6=
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
, d(ω, ρt) = accept if and only if firm t’s expected payoff from
accepting ω is non-negative given beliefs that the agency is strategic and acquires information
with probability ẽ(ω, ρt).
We claim that
(




constitutes an equilibrium, with
off-path beliefs such that upon observing an offer ω 6=
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
firm t as-
signs probability 1 to the agency being strategic and acquiring information with probability
ẽ(ω, ρt). By virtue of the one-shot deviation principle all that we need to show is that no
one-shot deviation gives the agency strictly greater expected payoff than following the strat-
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egy
(




. One-shot deviations to an offer which firm t rejects
are clearly unprofitable. So we examine a one-shot deviation to an offer ω = (φω(1), φω(−1))
which firm t accepts. The most profitable such deviation entails acquiring information with
























On the other hand, the offer ω being acceptable (under the belief that the agency is strategic













The latter inequality implies that the strategic agency can obtain at least the expected payoff
(34) by making the offer
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
and acquiring information with probability
ẽ(ω, ρt). As with offer
(
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, e∗(ρt)], 0
)
the information acquisition probability e∗(ρt)
is optimal, combining the previous remarks shows that no one-shot deviation to an offer ω
which firm t accepts is strictly profitable for the agency.

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Online Appendix A
In this appendix we check the robustness of our analysis by relaxing the assumption on the
perfect observability of project returns in case the agency chooses to become informed. We
show that, as in the baseline model:
• for some parameter values contingent fees improve expected social welfare relative to
upfront fees;
• upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees as long as the
cost of information acquisition, c, is sufficiently small.
The Model. The agency lives for two periods, t = 1, 2.32 For concreteness, we distinguish
now between a project’s quality, qt ∈ {−1, 1}, and a project’s return, Qt. By acquiring
information in period t, the agency observes a noisy signal st ∈ {−1, 1} of the project quality




33 As in the baseline model, the sequence {qt} is independent and identically
distributed according to P(qt = 1) = 12 . The baseline model therefore corresponds to ε = 0.
Applying Bayes’ rule gives
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt] = Φ(ρt, êt) :=
1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
1 + (1− ρt)(1− êt)
,
and




1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
]
.
Next, given e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ+ :=
0 if ρ = 0ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) if ρ > 0
; ρg :=
0 if ρ = 0ρ(1−ε)
1−ε+ε(1−ρ)(1−e(ρ)) if ρ > 0
; and
ρb :=
0 if ρ = 0ρε
ε+(1−ε)(1−ρ)(1−e(ρ)) if ρ > 0
.
The next definition is immediately adapted from the equilibrium concept of Section 2.
32We set here β = 1 to reduce notation.
33We scale up project returns by a factor equal to 11−2ε to keep the expected return conditional on observing
st precisely equal to st.
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Definition 3. An equilibrium with contingent fees comprises functions et : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
specifying the probabilities et(ρt) that the strategic agency acquires information in period t
given reputation ρt, for t = 1, 2, such that each period:
(i) the choice(s) implied by et(ρt) maximize the agency’s expected intertemporal profit given




ρg1 if q1 = 1 = r1;
ρ+1 if q1 = −1 = r1;
ρb1 if q1 = −1 = −r1.
(ii) firms and investors’ beliefs satisfy êt = et(ρt).
The definition of an equilibrium with upfront fees is obtained by replacing (35) with
πt = Υ(ρt, êt)− c1{information acquired in period t}. (36)
The Equilibria. We next characterize the equilibria with, respectively, contingent fees and
upfront fees. With 2 periods the strategic agency always shirks in period 2. So the focus is on
information acquisition at t = 1. Proofs of the propositions are relegated to the end of this
appendix.
Proposition 10. With contingent fees, in equilibrium e1(ρ1) > 0 if and only if δ > 2c and







2− (1 + ε)ρc






Moreover limc→0 e1(ρ1) < 1 for any ρ1 and δ.
Proposition 11. With upfront fees, in equilibrium e1(ρ1) > 0 if and only if δ > 4c and
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Moreover limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1 for any ρ1 and δ.
We illustrate the propositions in Figure 5. At t = 1 the strategic agency acquires infor-
mation, with some probability, for all (δ, ρ1) lying to the right of the curve ρc when fees are







Figure 5: Noisy signals of project returns
Welfare Comparison. As in equilibrium the strategic agency shirks at t = 2 irrespective
of the fee structure, comparing expected social welfare in equilibrium under different fee
structures reduces to comparing the probability that a strategic agency acquires information
at t = 1. When fees are contingent, for δ ∈ (2c, 4c) the strategic agency acquires information
at t = 1 with positive probability provided its reputation is not too high (Proposition 10). By
contrast, for δ ∈ (2c, 4c) the strategic agency shirks with probability 1 when fees are upfront
(Proposition 11). For δ ∈ (2c, 4c) and sufficiently low reputation expected social welfare is
therefore higher under contingent fees than under upfront fees. Moreover for any δ and ρ1,
limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1 only in the case of upfront fees. Thus upfront fees increase expected social
welfare if the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently low.
3
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Proof of Proposition 10: First, note that the function Φ is continuous, weakly increasing
in each of its arguments, and Φ(1, ·) = Φ(·, 1) = 1. Moreover, notice that in any equilibrium
the strategic agency must shirk at t = 2 with probability 1 giving π2 = Φ(ρ2, 0) =
ρ2
2−ρ2 .
Define V (ρ) := ρ
2−ρ . At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertemporal profit from shirking and








. The intertemporal profit from
acquiring information is equal to 1
2
Φ(ρ1, ê1)− c+ δ2
[
V (ρ+1 ) + (1− ε)V (ρ
g















This condition is always violated, thus in equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1. An equilibrium in which




















Substituting for Φ(·) and V (·) and simplifying yields






2− (1 + ε)ρ1






Notice that δ̃(ρ1) is continuous and increasing in ρ1 for ρ1 ∈ (0, 1) as it is the product of 3
terms, each of which is continuous and increasing in ρ1 for ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). Hence δ < δ̃(ρ1) is
equivalent to ρ1 > ρc(δ); moreover as δ̃(0) = 2c, then e1(ρ1) > 0 only if δ > 2c. Furthermore,
























The left-hand side of (37) is strictly decreasing in e(ρ1), while the right-hand side is strictly
increasing in e(ρ1), thus there is at most one e(ρ1) that satisfies the equality. Moreover, for
e(ρ1) = 0 this equality reduces to δ = δ̃(ρ1). As the left-hand side of (37) is increasing in δ and
the right-hand side does not depend on δ, then δ > δ̃(ρ1), which is equivalent to ρ1 < ρc(δ),
is necessary for an equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1). That this condition is also sufficient
follows from standard arguments.
4
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707069 
Pick a pair δ and ρ1. For sufficiently small c, δ > δ̃(ρ1), thus in equilibrium e1(ρ1) satisfies
(37). Note also that for c = 0 the unique e(ρ1) that satisfies (37) belongs to the interval
(0, 1). As both Φ(·) and V (·) are continuous in each of their arguments, then in equilibrium
limc→0 e1(ρ1) < 1.

Proof of Proposition 11: First notice that Υ is continuous, weakly increasing in each of
its arguments, and Υ(1, ·) = Υ(·, 1) = 1
2
. Moreover, note that in any equilibrium the strategic
agency must shirk at t = 2 with probability 1, giving π2 = Υ(ρ2, 0) =
ρ2
2
. Define V (ρ) := ρ
2
.
At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertemporal profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is








. The intertemporal profit from acquiring information
is equal to Υ(ρ1, ê1)− c+ δ2
[
V (ρ+1 ) + (1− ε)V (ρ
g




. Fix ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). An equilibrium
in which e1(ρ1) = 1 exists if and only if
δ
2





















Substituting for V (·) and simplifying yields






(1− ρ1)(1− 2ε(1− ε)ρ1)
)
.
As δ(ρ1) is continuous and increasing in ρ1, then δ < δ(ρ1) is equivalent to ρ1 > ρu(δ);
moreover, as δ(0) = 4c, then e1(ρ1) > 0 only if δ > 4c. Furthermore, an equilibrium in which


















ε+ (1− ε)(1− ρ1)(1− e(ρ1))
)]
= c.
The left-hand side of (38) is strictly decreasing in e(ρ1), and the right-hand side is strictly
5
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increasing in e(ρ1), thus there is at most one e(ρ1) that satisfies the equality. Moreover, for
e(ρ1) = 0 this equality reduces to δ = δ(ρ1). As the left-hand side is increasing in δ and
the left-hand side does not depend on δ, δ > δ(ρ1) is necessary for an equilibrium in which
e1(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1). That this condition is also sufficient follows from standard arguments.
Next, fix δ and ρ1. For sufficiently small c, δ > δ(ρ1), thus in equilibrium e1(ρ1) satisfies
(38). Note also that, for c = 0, e(ρ1) = 1 satisfies (38). Continuity of Φ thus ensures that in
equilibrium limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1. 
6
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Online Appendix B
In this appendix we check the robustness of our analysis by allowing the agency to announce
rt = −1 whether or not in period t the agency chooses to acquire information. We show that,
as in the baseline model:
• for some parameter values contingent fees improve expected social welfare relative to
upfront fees;
• upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees as long as the
cost of information acquisition, c, is sufficiently small.
The Model. The agency lives for two periods, t = 1, 2.34 We let ẑt denote the beginning-of-
period-t belief that the strategic agency will announce rt = −1 in case it shirks.35 Applying
Bayes’ rule,
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ẑt] = Φ(ρt, êt, ẑt) :=
1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
1 + (1− ρt)(1− êt)(1− 2ẑt)
,
while
E[qt|rt = −1, ρt, êt, ẑt] =
(−1)(1− (1− ρt)(1− êt))
ρt + (1− ρt)êt + 2ẑt(1− ρt)(1− êt)
.
Note that E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ẑt] ≥ 0 ≥ E[qt|rt = −1, ρt, êt, ẑt] for all ρt, êt and ẑt. So with
contingent fees the period-t profit of the agency is
πt = Φ(ρt, êt, ẑt)1{rt=1} − c1{information acquired in period t}. (39)
Applying Bayes’ rule again,




1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
]
.
With upfront fees, the period-t profit of the agency is
πt = Υ(ρt, êt)− c1{information acquired in period t}. (40)
34We set here β = 1 to reduce notation.
35As noted in the baseline model, upon acquiring information the strategic agency would report truthfully
even if it had the option to misreport. Thus we assume here, as in the baseline model, that upon acquiring
information the agency reports truthfully.
7
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Given functions et(·) and zt(·) from [0, 1] to [0, 1], define
ρ+t :=
0 if ρt = 0;ρt
ρt+(1−ρt)[et(ρt)+(1−et(ρt))(1−zt(ρt))] if ρt > 0;
and
ρ++t :=
0 if ρt = 0;ρt
ρt+(1−ρt)[e(ρt)+(1−e(ρt))zt(ρt)] if ρt > 0.
The next definition is immediately adapted from the equilibrium concept of Section 2.
Definition 4. An equilibrium with contingent fees comprises functions et : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and
zt : [0, 1] → [0, 1], for t = 1, 2, specifying the probabilities et(ρt) that the strategic agency ac-
quires information and zt(ρt) of announcing rt = −1 conditional on shirking, given reputation
ρt, such that each period:
(i) the choices implied by et(ρt) and zt(ρt) maximize the agency’s expected intertemporal
profit given (39) and
ρ2 =

ρ+1 if q1 = r1 = 1;
ρ++1 if q1 = r1 = −1;
0 if q1 = −r1.
(ii) firms and investors’ beliefs satisfy êt = et(ρt) and ẑt = zt(ρt).
The definition of an equilibrium with upfront fees is obtained replacing (39) with (40).
The Equilibria. We next characterize the equilibria with, respectively, contingent fees and
upfront fees. With 2 periods the strategic agency always shirks in period 2. So the focus is on
information acquisition at t = 1. Proofs of the propositions are relegated to the end of this
appendix.
Proposition 12. Let fees be contingent. In equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). More-
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Proposition 13. Let fees be upfront. In equilibrium, if δ ≤ 4c then e1(ρ1) = 0 for all
ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). If instead δ > 4c then
if ρ1 ∈ [4cδ , 1) then e(ρ1) = 1;
if ρ1 ∈ ( 2cδ−2c ,
4c
δ
) then e(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1);
if ρ1 ∈ (0, 2cδ−2c ] then e(ρ1) = 0.
We illustrate in Figure 6 the regions in (δ, ρ1)-space identified in the two propositions.
When fees are contingent, at t = 1 the strategic agency acquires information, with some
probability, for all (δ, ρ1) lying to the right of the solid curves. When fees are upfront, the
strategic agency acquires information, with some probability, for all (δ, ρ1) in between the

















2 b = 4c
Figure 6: Deflated ratings
Welfare Comparison. Since the strategic agency shirks at t = 2 irrespective of the fee
structure, and, for the symmetrical payoffs we consider, welfare does not depend on the
9
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agency’s choice to inflate or deflate a rating in case it shirks, social welfare is therefore uniquely
determined by the probability that the agency acquires information at t = 1. Note that in the












shirks at t = 1 with upfront fees (Proposition 13) but acquires information with positive
probability with contingent fees (Proposition 12), thus contingent fees improve expected social




hence ensuring e1(ρ1) = 1 with upfront fees (Proposition 13). As e1(ρ1) < 1 everywhere with
contingent fees (Proposition 12), the previous remarks establish that, for any ρ1 and δ, upfront
fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees as long as c is sufficiently small.
Proof of Proposition 12: The function Φ is continuous, weakly increasing in each of its
arguments, and Φ(1, ·, ·) = Φ(·, 1, ·) = 1. Notice that in any equilibrium the strategic agency
must shirk and announce r2 = 1 at t = 2 with probability 1 giving π2 = Φ(ρ2, 0, 0) =
ρ2
2−ρ2 . De-
fine V (ρ) := ρ
2−ρ . Let ρ
+
1 (e, z) (respectively ρ
++





for e1(ρ1) = e and z1(ρ1) = z. At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertemporal profit from shirk-
ing and announcing rt = 1 is equal to Φ(ρ1, ê1, ẑ1) +
δ
2
V (ρ+1 (ê1, ẑ1)), the intertemporal profit
from shirking and announcing rt = −1 is equal to δ2V (ρ
++
1 (ê1, ẑ1)), and the intertemporal profit
from acquiring information is equal to 1
2
Φ(ρ1, ê1, ẑ1) − c + δ2
[





The rest of the proof contains 3 steps. Step 1 establishes than in equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1.
Step 2 computes the probability with which the strategic agency must announce r1 = −1 if
in equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0. Step 3 characterizes a parameter region in which e1(ρ1) > 0.
Step 1: An equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 1 requires
δV (ρ1)
2
− c ≥ Φ(ρ1, 1, z1)
2
, (41)
for some z1. Note that, for any z1 and any ρ1: Φ(ρ1, 1, z1) = 1 > V (ρ1). Thus (41) holds only
if δ−1
2
> c. This condition is violated as c > 0 > δ−1
2
. Hence in equilibrium e(ρ1) < 1.
Step 2: Define z̃(ρ1) implicitly by
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which is equivalent to
ρ1






ρ1 + 2(1− ρ1)z̃
− ρ1
1 + (1− ρ1)(1− 2z̃)
)
.
Simplifying to solve for z̃ gives z̃(ρ1) =
δ(1−ρ1)−ρ1
2(1−ρ1)(δ+1) . Note that z̃(ρ1) < 1 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1),








V (ρ++1 ) − V (ρ+1 )
]
implies




V (ρ++1 )− V (ρ+1 )
]
implies z(ρ1) = 1. Thus, by construction








. Note that ρc(δ) ∈ ( δ
1+δ
, 1) ⇔ ρc(δ) ∈
(0, δ
1+δ









, 1). Consider a ρ1 ≥ δ1+δ . Step 2 ensures that an equilibrium with
e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if:
Φ(ρ1,0,0)
2
+c ≥ δV (1)
2
. This condition is equivalent to: ρ1 ≥ ρc(δ).
Now consider a ρ1 ≤ δ1+δ . Step 2 ensures that an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and
only if: Φ(ρ1,0,z̃(ρ1))
2




. This condition is equivalent to: ρ1 ≤ ρc(δ). Thus, in
light of step 1, we conclude that for ρ1 ∈ (ρc(δ), ρc(δ)) in equilibrium e1(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1). 
Proof of Proposition 13: Note that Υ is continuous, weakly increasing in each of its argu-
ments, and Υ(1, ·) = Υ(·, 1) = 1
2
. Define V (ρ) := ρ
2
. At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertem-
poral profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is equal to Υ(ρ1, ê1) +
δ
2
V (ρ+1 ), the intertem-
poral profit from shirking and announcing rt = −1 is equal to Υ(ρ1, ê1) + δ2V (ρ
++
1 ), and the









Observe that in any equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1 implies z1(ρ1) =
1
2












1 ) and thus V (ρ
++
1 ) < V (ρ
+
1 ) (resp. V (ρ
+
1 ) < V (ρ
++
1 )).



















Next, an equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if
δ
2
V (f(ρ1, 0)) ≤ c that is, if and
11
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Similarly, an equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) = 1 exists if and only if
δ
2
V (f(ρ1, 1)) ≥ c that is,







< 1⇔ δ > 4c.
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Online Appendix C
We show in this appendix that our main results do not depend on the assumption that the
agency obtains a fraction β of all proceeds from selling projects to investors. Specifically, we
generalize the baseline model by letting φt(rt) satisfy
φt(rt) =
f(E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt]) if rt = 1;0 if rt = −1,
where f(·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] denotes a strictly increasing continuous function satisfying f(x) ≤ x
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. We assume in line with the baseline model that c < f(1)
2
. In what follows we
first state the main results, and then provide all the proofs.
Proposition 14. An equilibrium exists and is unique. In equilibrium, e(0) = 0; for ρ > 0 the
equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs ρ and ρ, ρ ≤ ρ, such that
if ρ ∈ [ρ, 1] then e(ρ) = 0,
if ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ) then e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1),
if ρ ∈ (0, ρ] then e(ρ) = 1.
Moreover, the equilibrium fee is a non-decreasing function of the agency’s reputation.
The model with upfront fees is generalized by letting
φt(1) = φt(−1) = f(P(rt = 1|ρt, êt)E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt]).




then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium with




the unique equilibrium is
e(ρ) =
1 if ρ > 0;0 if ρ = 0.
Combining Propositions 14 and 15 yields the next theorem.






) then, for ρ1 ∈ (0, ρ̃), contingent
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) upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees.
In all other cases, expected social welfare is the same whether fees are upfront or contingent.
We prove in the rest of this appendix all of the previous results. Define Φ(·, ·) : [0, 1] ×
[0, 1]→ R by
Φ(ρ, e) :=
1− (1− ρ)(1− e)
1 + (1− ρ)(1− e)
.
Given a function e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ+ :=
0 if ρ = 0,ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) if ρ > 0.
Lemma 7. In any equilibrium, e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0, where V (·) denotes the equilibrium
value function. For all ρ > 0,if δ2V (ρ+) > 12f(Φ(ρ, e(ρ))) + c then e(ρ) = 1,if δ
2
V (ρ+) < 1
2
f(Φ(ρ, e(ρ))) + c then e(ρ) = 0.
Proof: By virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,























for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the choice implied by e(ρ) maximizes the right-hand side of the expression
above. That is:e(ρ) = 1 if
1
2

















e(ρ) = 0 if 1
2

















We are only left to show that e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0. That e(0) = 0 follows from the above,
noting that ρ+ = 0 if ρ = 0. Substituting back into (42) then yields V (0) = f(Φ(0, 0)) +
δV (0) = δV (0). Hence V (0) = 0.

14
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Lemma 8. In any equilibrium,





























≥ V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The lemma follows from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality together with the obser-
vations that (a) e(ρ) = 1 implies ρ+ = ρ, (b) ρ = 1 implies ρ+ = 1, (c) Φ(1, e) = 1 for all
e ∈ [0, 1], and (d) Φ(·, ·) is weakly increasing in both variables.





1 if ρ > 0,0 if ρ = 0. (43)
is an equilibrium. If δ < δ, in any equilibrium: e(ρ) < 1 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: By Lemma 7, e(0) = 0 for all δ. Next, consider ρ > 0. If in equilibrium e(ρ) = 1 then
by Lemma 7 and the observation that ρ+ = ρ:
δ
2
V (ρ) ≥ 1
2
f(Φ(ρ, 1)) + c.










f(Φ(ρ, 1)) + c,
or, equivalently, δ ≥ δ once we note that Φ(ρ, 1) = 1. The condition δ ≥ δ is thus necessary
for e(ρ) = 1. Sufficiency follows from the one-shot deviation principle.

Lemma 9. The following are equivalent:
δ ≥ δ (44)
15
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1
2

































Moreover, the equivalence between (44)-(46) continues to hold with strict inequalities instead
of weak inequalities.
Proof: Equivalence is easily checked using Φ(ρ, 1) = 1.

Proposition 17. If δ > δ then (43) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 7, e(0) = 0 in any equilibrium. So we are only left to show that, in any
equilibrium, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.
Suppose that an equilibrium exists such that e(ρ̂) < 1 for some ρ̂ > 0. Applying first
Lemma 7 then Lemma 8:
1
2
f(Φ(ρ̂, e(ρ̂))) + c ≥ δ
2








We thus obtain, using the equivalence between (44) and (46) (with strict inequalities), the











f(Φ(ρ̂, 1)) + c ≥ 1
2








from which we infer that e(ρ̂+) < 1. We can thus repeat the steps above with ρ̂+ instead of
ρ̂, and so on. This process determines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all n:
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By (i)-(ii), either e(ρn) → 1 or ρn → 1. Hence, taking limits in (iii) yields (using continuity
of Φ(·, ·), continuity of f(·) and the fact that Φ(1, e) = Φ(ρ, 1) = 1 for all e and ρ in [0, 1]):
1
2








The equivalence between (44) and (46) (with strict inequalities) establishes a contradiction
between (48) and δ > δ.

Proposition 18. If δ ≤ δ := 2c
f(1)+c
then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium.









Next, the assumption f(1) > 2c > 0 implies δ < δ; combining Lemmas 8 and 9 thus shows






whenever δ < δ. Combining (49), (50) and Lemma 8 now yields c > δ
2
V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1).
Hence, by Lemma 7, e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
That e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium is immediate from (49), (50), and the
one-shot deviation principle.

Proposition 19. Let δ ∈ (δ, δ). There exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium,e(ρ) = 0 if ρ ∈ {0} ∪ [ρ̃, 1]e(ρ) ∈ (0, ẽ] if ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃) (51)
where ρ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and ẽ ∈ (0, 1) are defined implicitly by
1
2
























Proof: Applying Lemma 9,
δ < δ ⇔ 1
2


















Thus ρ̃ ∈ (0, 1) and ẽ ∈ (0, 1).
We now prove the rest of the proposition. We will first proceed by induction to show that
there can exist at most one equilibrium. We will then argue that the inductive procedure
yields an equilibrium. As a preliminary step, observe that by Lemma 8 and the equivalence






for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
The inductive procedure starts as follows. Combining (52) and (54), any equilibrium must
be such that, for all ρ > ρ̃ :
1
2




Thus, by Lemma 7, if an equilibrium exists it must satisfy e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ > ρ̃. A similar
argument shows that in fact the same must be true for ρ = ρ̃.
By contrast, consider ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃). The combination of (52), (54), and Lemma 7 shows that
e(ρ) = 0 is impossible in equilibrium. Similarly, the combination of (53), (54) and Lemma 7
shows that e(ρ) > ẽ is impossible in equilibrium. Thus, any equilibrium must satisfy (51). By






f(Φ(ρ, e(ρ))) + c (55)
must hold for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃).
18
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Next define ρ1 < ρ̃ such that
ρ̃ =
ρ1
ρ1 + (1− ρ1)ẽ
.
By construction of ρ1 and property (51), in any equilibrium: ρ
+ ≥ ρ̃ for all ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ̃). (55),
(51) and (54) now pin down a unique candidate equilibrium e(ρ) for each ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ̃) (which
moreover is continuous in ρ). Repeating the step above with ρ1 instead of ρ̃ yields ρ2 < ρ1 and
a unique candidate equilibrium e(ρ) for each ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1), and so on. This defines a sequence
{ρn} where, for all n, ρ̃n = ρn+1ρn+1+(1−ρn+1)ẽ . As ẽ < 1, ρn → 0. This inductive procedure
therefore pins down a unique candidate equilibrium. That this candidate equilibrium is in
fact an equilibrium is a consequence of the one-shot deviation principle.

Proof of Proposition 14: Follows from Propositions 16-19.





(1− (1− ρ)(1− e)).
Lemma 10. In any equilibrium, e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0, where V (·) denotes the equilibrium
value function. For all ρ > 0,if δ2V (ρ+) > c then e(ρ) = 1,if δ
2
V (ρ+) < c then e(ρ) = 0.
Proof: By virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,
V (ρ) = max
{


















for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], and the choice implied by e(ρ) maximizes the right-hand side of (56). That
is:
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We are only left to show that e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0. That e(0) = 0 follows from the above,
noting that ρ+ = 0 if ρ = 0. Substituting back into (56) then yields V (0) = f(Φ(0, 0)) +
δV (0) = δV (0). Hence V (0) = 0.

Lemma 11. In any equilibrium,






















≥ V (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The lemma follows from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality together with the obser-
vations that (a) e(ρ) = 1 implies ρ+ = ρ, (b) ρ = 1 implies ρ+ = 1, (c) Υ(1, e) = 1
2
for all
e ∈ [0, 1], and (d) Υ(·, ·) is weakly increasing in both variables.







1 if ρ > 0,0 if ρ = 0. (57)




, in any equilibrium: e(ρ) < 1 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: By Lemma 10, e(0) = 0 for all δ. Next, consider ρ > 0. If in equilibrium e(ρ) = 1
then Lemma 10 and the observation that ρ+ = ρ yield
δ
2
V (ρ) ≥ c.












once we note that Υ(ρ, 1) = 1
2





necessary for e(ρ) = 1. Sufficiency follows from the one-shot deviation principle.

20
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The equivalence between (58)-(60) continues to hold with strict inequalities instead of weak
inequalities.








then (57) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof: By Lemma 10, e(0) = 0 in any equilibrium. So we are only left to show that, in any
equilibrium, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.
Suppose an equilibrium exists such that e(ρ̂) < 1 for some ρ̂ > 0. Applying first Lemma
10 then Lemma 11:
c ≥ δ
2

























from which we infer that e(ρ̂+) < 1. We can thus repeat the steps above with ρ̂+ instead of
ρ̂, and so on. This process determines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all n:
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By (i)-(ii), either e(ρn) → 1 or ρn → 1. Hence, taking limits in (iii) yields (using continuity
of Υ(·, ·) and the fact that Υ(1, e) = Υ(ρ, 1) = 1
2









The equivalence between (58) and (60) (with strict inequalities) establishes a contradiction
with (62).





then e(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the unique equilibrium.




















Combining (63) and (64) gives c > δ
2
V (1); hence, by Lemma 11, c > δ
2
V (ρ) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 10 thus yields e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
That e(ρ) = 0, for all ρ ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium is immediate from (63), (64), and the
one-shot deviation principle.

Proof of Proposition 15: Follows from Propositions 20-22.

Proof of Theorem 3: Proposition 14 characterizes the unique equilibrium with contingent
fees, and Proposition 15 characterizes the unique equilibrium with upfront fees. The cutoff
δ = 2f(1)+4c
3f(1)+2c
is taken from Proposition 16. The cutoff δ = 2c
f(1)+c
is taken from Proposition 18.
With upfront fees, either the strategic agency shirks irrespective of ρt or the strategic agency
acquires information with probability 1 irrespective of ρt. Hence, all that remains to show is
22
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that the expected period-t welfare is an increasing function of the probability with which the
strategic agency chooses to acquire information. For this proof
The expected period-t welfare is
P(rt = 1)E[qt|rt = 1]− c
(









)1− (1− ρt)(1− e(ρt))
1 + (1− ρt)(1− e(ρt))
− c
(







ρt + (1− ρt)e(ρt)
)
;
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Online Appendix D
In this appendix we generalize the model presented in Online Appendix B by letting the prior
probability γ of qt = 1 take any value in (0, 1) and show that all our main results continue
to hold. We normalize a project’s return so that either qt = 1 or qt =
−γ
1−γ . Hence E[qt] = 0
irrespective of γ. The model described in Online Appendix B corresponds to the case γ = 1
2
.
The definitions from Online Appendix B all apply here as well with the functions Φ and Υ
now replaced, respectively, by
Φ†(ρt, êt, ẑt) :=
1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
1 + 1−γ
γ
(1− ρt)(1− êt)(1− ẑt1−γ )
and
Υ†(ρt, êt) := γ
[
1− (1− ρt)(1− êt)
]
.
The Equilibria. We next characterize the equilibria with, respectively, contingent fees and
upfront fees. With 2 periods the strategic agency always shirks in period 2. So the focus is on
information acquisition at t = 1. Proofs of the propositions are relegated to the end of this
appendix.
Proposition 23. Let fees be contingent. In equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). More-
over, the equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs ρ†, ρ† and δ such that, for δ > δ, e1(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1)





Proposition 24. Let fees be upfront. Let x := min{γ, 1− γ}. In equilibrium, if δ ≤ c
γx
then
e1(ρ1) = 0 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). If instead δ > cγx then
ρ1 ∈ ( cδγx , 1) implies e(ρ1) = 1;
ρ1 ∈ ( cδγ−c ,
c
δγx
) implies e(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1);
ρ1 ∈ (0, cδγ−c) implies e(ρ1) = 0.
Welfare Comparison. As in Online Appendix B, since the strategic agency shirks at t = 2
irrespective of the fee structure, and, for the payoffs we consider, welfare does not depend on
the agency’s choice to inflate or deflate a rating in case it shirks, social welfare is uniquely
determined by the probability that the agency acquires information at t = 1. In the parameter
24
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region defined by δ ∈ (δ, c
γx




the agency shirks at t = 1 with upfront
fees (Proposition 24) but acquires information with positive probability with contingent fees
(Proposition 23), thus contingent fees improve expected social welfare. Since δ < c
γx
, the
aforementioned region is non-empty (we call this observation Remark 1 and prove it below).







ensuring e1(ρ1) = 1 with upfront fees (Proposition 24). As e1(ρ1) < 1 everywhere with
contingent fees (Proposition 23), then for any ρ1 and δ upfront fees improve expected social
welfare for sufficiently small c.
Proof of Proposition 23: The function Φ† is continuous, weakly increasing in each of its
arguments, and Φ†(1, ·, ·) = Φ†(·, 1, ·) = 1. Notice that in any equilibrium the strate-
gic agency must shirk and announce r2 = 1 at t = 2 with probability 1 giving π2 =
Φ†(ρ2, 0, 0) =
γρ2
1−(1−γ)ρ2 . Define V (ρ) :=
γρ
1−(1−γ)ρ . Let ρ
+
1 (e, z) (respectively ρ
++
1 (e, z)) de-
note the value of ρ+1 (respectively ρ
++
1 ) for e1(ρ1) = e and z1(ρ1) = z. At t = 1, the
agency’s expected intertemporal profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is equal to
Φ†(ρ1, ê1, ẑ1)+δγV (ρ
+
1 (ê1, ẑ1)), the intertemporal profit from shirking and announcing rt = −1
is equal to δ(1 − γ)V (ρ++1 (ê1, ẑ1)), and the intertemporal profit from acquiring information
is equal to γΦ†(ρ1, ê1, ẑ1) − c + δ
[
γV (ρ+1 (ê1, ẑ1)) + (1 − γ)V (ρ++1 (ê1, ẑ1))
]
. The rest of the
proof contains 3 steps. Step 1 establishes than in equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1. Step 2 computes
the probability with which the strategic agency must announce r1 = −1 if in equilibrium
e1(ρ1) = 0. Step 3 characterizes a parameter region in which e1(ρ1) > 0.
Step 1: An equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 1 requires
δ(1− γ)V (ρ1)− c ≥ (1− γ)Φ†(ρ1, 1, z1), (65)
for some z1. Note that, for any z1 and any ρ1: Φ(ρ1, 1, z1) = 1 > V (ρ1). Thus (65) is violated
as c > 0 and δ < 1. Hence in equilibrium e(ρ1) < 1.
Step 2: Define z̃(ρ1) implicitly by
Φ†(ρ1, 0, z̃(ρ1)) = δ
[
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which is equivalent to
ρ1γ




ρ1 + (1− ρ1)z̃ − (1− γ)ρ1
− γ
2ρ1
1− ρ1(1− γ)− (1− ρ1)z̃
)
.







. Note that z̃(ρ1) < 1 if and
only if ρ1 <
1+γδ
(1+γδ)−(γ(1−δ)+2δγ2) and this condition is satisfied for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1); furthermore,






(1−γ)δ+(γ(1−δ)+2γ2δ) . Note that ρ
†
1(δ) ∈ (0, 1).
By construction of z̃(ρ1), in equilibrium, e1(ρ1) = 0 implies z(ρ1) = z̃(ρ1) if ρ1 ≤ ρ†1(δ) and
z(ρ1) = 0 if ρ1 > ρ
†
1(δ).
Step 3: Define ρ†(δ) = δ(1−γ)−c
δ(1−γ)2+(γ−c)(1−γ) , ρ
†(δ) := c(1+δγ)
δ2γ2−2cδγ2+cδγ+2δγ2−2cγ+γ2+c . Consider first
ρ1 ≥ ρ†1(δ). Step 2 ensures that an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if: (1 −
γ)Φ†(ρ1, 0, 0) ≥ (1 − γ)δV (1) − c. This condition is equivalent to: ρ1 ≤ ρ†(δ). We conclude
that if ρ1 ∈ [ρ†1(δ), ρ†(δ)) in equilibrium e1 ∈ (0, 1). Now consider a ρ1 ≤ ρ
†
1(δ). Step 2
ensures that an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if (1− γ)Φ†(ρ1, 0, z̃(ρ1)) + c ≥
(1 − γ)δV (ρ++1 (0, z̃(ρ1))). This condition is equivalent to: ρ1 ≤ ρc(δ). We conclude that if
ρ1(ρ
c(δ), ρ†1(δ)) in equilibrium e1 ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, straightforward algebra shows that both ρc(δ) > ρ†(δ) and ρc(δ) < ρ†(δ) are
equivalent to c < δγ(1−γ)(1+δ)
1+δγ





2γ(1−γ) . This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 24: Note that Υ† is continuous, weakly increasing in each of its ar-
guments, and Υ†(1, ·) = Υ†(·, 1) = γ. Define V (ρ) := γρ. Let ρ+1 (e, z) (respectively ρ++1 (e, z))
denote the value of ρ+1 (respectively ρ
++
1 ) for e1(ρ1) = e and z1(ρ1) = z. At t = 1, the
agency’s expected intertemporal profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is equal to
Υ†(ρ1, ê1) + δγV (ρ
+
1 (ê1, ẑ1)), the intertemporal profit from shirking and announcing rt = −1
is equal to Υ†(ρ1, ê1) + δ(1 − γ)V (ρ++1 (ê1, ẑ1)), and the intertemporal profit from acquiring
information is equal to Υ†(ρ1, ê1) + δ
[
γV (ρ+1 (ê1, ẑ1)) + (1− γ)V (ρ++1 (ê1, ẑ1))
]
− c.
We now consider two cases. These cases together prove the proposition.
Case 1. Let γ ∈ (0, 1
2
]. In equilibrium, if δ < c
γ2
then e1(ρ1) = 0 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). If
26
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707069 
instead δ > c
γ2
then 
if ρ1 ∈ ( cδγ2 , 1) then e(ρ1) = 1,
if ρ1 ∈ ( cδγ−c ,
c
δγ2
) then e(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1),
if ρ1 ∈ (0, cδγ−c) then e(ρ1) = 0.
Define z̃(ρ1) implicitly as follows:
γV (ρ+1 (0, z̃(ρ1))) = (1− γ)V (ρ++1 (0, z̃(ρ1))), (66)
Solving (66) we obtain z̃(ρ1) = 1− γ + (1− 2γ) ρ11−ρ1 .
As γ ∈ (0, 1
2




1−γ ∈ (0, 1). By construction of z̃(ρ1), in equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0 implies z(ρ1) = z̃(ρ1) if
ρ1 <
γ
1−γ , and z(ρ1) = 1 if ρ1 ≥
γ
1−γ .
Fix first ρ1 ≥ γ1−γ . An equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if δγV (ρ
+
1 (0, 1)) ≤ c,
which is equivalent to δ ≤ c
γ2
. Fix δ < c
γ2
. As V (ρ+1 (0, 1)) = V (1) ≥ V (ρ2) for all ρ2 ∈ [0, 1],
then for and any e1 and z1: δγV (ρ
+
1 (e1, z1)) < c. Hence in any equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0 (and
z1(ρ1) = 1).
Fix now ρ1 <
γ
1−γ . An equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if δγV (ρ
+
1 (0, z̃(ρ1))) ≤
c, which is equivalent to ρ1 ≤ cδγ−c . Fix ρ1 <
c
δγ−c . Clearly in this region if in equi-
librium with z1(ρ1) = z̃(ρ1) then e1(ρ1) = 0. Suppose an equilibrium exists in which
z1(ρ1) > z̃(ρ1); note that for any ê1: δ(1−γ)V (ρ++1 (ê1, z1(ρ1))) ≤ δ(1−γ)V (ρ++1 (0, z1(ρ1))) <
δ(1− γ)V (ρ++1 (0, z̃1(ρ1))) = δγV (ρ+1 (0, z̃1(ρ1))) < c, hence in such an equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0.
Suppose now that an equilibrium exists in which z1(ρ1) < z̃(ρ1); note that for any ê1:
δγV (ρ+1 (ê1, z1(ρ1))) ≤ δγV (ρ+1 (0, z1(ρ1))) < δγV (ρ+1 (0, z̃1(ρ1))) < c, hence in such an equilib-
rium e1(ρ1) = 0. Hence in any equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0 (and z1(ρ1) = z̃(ρ1)).
Note that, for δ < c
γ2
, c
δγ−c > 1 ≥ ρ1 for all ρ1. Hence if either δ <
c
γ2





δγ−c then in equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0.




1 = ρ1. As
γ ≤ 1
2
, in such equilibrium γV (ρ+1 ) < (1− γ)V (ρ++1 ), hence z1(ρ1) = 1. Thus an equilibrium




. Note that for any e1 and z1, ρ
+
1 (e1, z1) ≥ ρ1, hence δγV (ρ+1 ) > c, i.e. there is no
equilibrium in which the agency shirks and deflates with positive probability. Moreover, as
γ ≤ 1
2
: δ(1 − γ)V (ρ+1 ) ≥ δ(1 − γ)V (ρ1) ≥ δγV (ρ1) > c, i.e. there is no equilibrium in which
27
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e1(ρ) = 1. Noting that an equilibrium exists for all parameter values concludes the proof of
case 1.
Case 2. Let γ ∈ (1
2
, 1). In equilibrium, if δ < c
γ(1−γ) then e1(ρ1) = 0 for all ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). If
instead δ > c
γ(1−γ) then
if ρ1 ∈ ( cδγ(1−γ) , 1) then e(ρ1) = 1,
if ρ1 ∈ ( cδγ−c ,
c
δγ(1−γ)) then e(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1),
if ρ1 ∈ (0, cδγ−c) then e(ρ1) = 0.
Consider z̃(ρ1), as defined by (66). As γ ∈ (12 , 1), then z̃(ρ1) < 1 for all ρ1, while z̃(ρ1) > 0





∈ (0, 1). By construction of z̃(ρ1), in equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0
implies z(ρ1) = z̃(ρ1) if ρ1 <
1−γ
γ
, and z(ρ1) = 0 if ρ1 ≥ 1−γγ .
So for ρ1 ≥ 1−γγ an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if δ(1−γ)V (ρ
++
1 (0, 0)) ≤ c,
which is equivalent to δ ≤ c
γ(1−γ) . Consider δ <
c
γ(1−γ) . As V (ρ
++
1 (0, 0)) = V (1) ≥ V (ρ2) for





instead, an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 0 exists if and only if δγV (ρ
+
1 (0, z̃(ρ1))) ≤
c, which is equivalent to ρ1 ≤ cδγ−c . The proof that in equilibrium e1(ρ1) = 0 for ρ1 <
c
δγ−c




Consider now an equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) = 1. As γ >
1
2
, in such equilibrium z1(ρ1) = 0.
Thus an equilibrium with e1(ρ1) = 1 exists if and only if δ(1 − γ)V (ρ1) ≥ c that is, if and
only if ρ1 ≥ cδγ(1−γ) . Let ρ1 >
c
δγ(1−γ) . Note that for any e1 and z1, ρ
++
1 (e1, z1) ≥ ρ1, hence
δ(1 − γ)V (ρ++1 ) > c. Moreover, as γ > 12 : δγV (ρ
+
1 ) ≥ δγV (ρ1) > δ(1 − γ)V (ρ1) > c. Thus
for ρ1 >
c
δγ(1−γ) in equilibrium e1(ρ) = 1. Noting that an equilibrium exists for all parameter
values concludes the proof of case 2.

Proof of Remark 1: As shown in the Proof of Proposition 23, δ > δ implies
c <
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We prove the remark by showing that for δ = c
γx
condition (67) holds. We consider the cases
γ ≤ 1
2
and γ > 1
2
separately.
Let γ ≤ 1
2
, hence x = γ. For δ = c
γ2










(2γ − 1)γ2 < (1− γ − γ2)c.
This last inequality holds as (2γ − 1)γ2 < 0 < (1− γ − γ2)c.
Let now γ > 1
2
, hence x = 1− γ. For δ = c








This condition is equivalent to γ < 1, which clearly holds. 
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Online Appendix E
In this appendix we check the robustness of our analysis by assuming that investors and firms
never observe q. We show that, as in the baseline model:
• for some parameter values contingent fees improve expected social welfare relative to
upfront fees;
• upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees as long as the
cost of information acquisition, c, is sufficiently small.
The Model. The agency lives for two periods. The model differs from the one discussed in
Section 3 only in that investors and firms never observe qt (and we set β = 1).
Given e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ+ :=
0 if ρ = 0ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) if ρ > 0
; ρ− :=
0 if ρ = 0ρ
1+(1−ρ)(1−e) if ρ > 0
The next definition is immediately adapted from the equilibrium concept of Section 2.
Definition 5. An equilibrium with contingent fees comprises functions et : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
specifying the probabilities et(ρt) that the strategic agency acquires information in period t
given reputation ρt, for t = 1, 2, such that each period:
(i) the choice(s) implied by et(ρt) maximize the agency’s expected intertemporal profit given
by (35), and
ρ2 =
ρ+1 if r1 = −1;ρ−1 if r1 = 1;
(ii) firms and investors’ beliefs satisfy êt = et(ρt).
The definition of an equilibrium with upfront fees is obtained by replacing (35) with (36).
The Equilibria. We next characterize the equilibria with, respectively, contingent fees and
upfront fees. Proofs of the propositions are relegated to the end of this appendix.
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Proposition 25. With contingent fees, in equilibrium e1(ρ1) > 0 if and only if δ > 2c and











Moreover limc→0 e1(ρ1) < 1 for any ρ1 and δ.
Proposition 26. With upfront fees, in equilibrium e1(ρ1) > 0 if and only if δ > 4c and
ρ1 < ρu(δ) :=
4c−δ
2−δ . Moreover limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1 for any ρ1 and δ.
Welfare Comparison. When fees are contingent, for δ ∈ (2c, 4c) the strategic agency
acquires information at t = 1 with positive probability provided its reputation is not too high
(Proposition 25). By contrast, for δ ∈ (2c, 4c) the strategic agency shirks with probability
1 when fees are upfront (Proposition 26). For δ ∈ (2c, 4c) and sufficiently low reputation
expected social welfare is therefore higher under contingent fees than under upfront fees.
Moreover for any δ and ρ1, limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1 only in the case of upfront fees. Thus upfront
fees increase expected social welfare if the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently low.
Proof of Proposition 25: Define V (ρ) := ρ
2−ρ . At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertempo-
ral profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is equal to Φ(ρ1, ê1) + δV (ρ
−
1 ). The intertem-
poral profit from acquiring information is equal to 1
2
Φ(ρ1, ê1)− c+ δ2
[





Fix ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). An equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) = 1 exists if and only if
Φ(ρ1, 1) + δV (ρ1) ≤
1
2
Φ(ρ1, 1)− c+ δV (ρ1). (68)
This condition is always violated, thus in equilibrium e1(ρ1) < 1. An equilibrium in which
e1(ρ1) = 0 in turn exists if and only if

















Substituting for Φ(·) and V (·) and simplifying yields
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Notice that δ̃(ρ1) is continuous and increasing in ρ1 for ρ1 ∈ (0, 1) as it is the product of
2 terms, each of which is continuous and increasing in ρ1 for ρ1 ∈ (0, 1). Hence δ < δ̃(ρ1) is
equivalent to ρ1 > ρc(δ); moreover as δ̃(0) = 2c, then e1(ρ1) > 0 only if δ > 2c. The proof that
δ > δ̃(ρ1) is necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium in which e1 ∈ (0, 1) follows standard
arguments.
Pick a pair δ and ρ1. For sufficiently small c, δ > 2c, thus in equilibrium e1(ρ1) ∈ (0, 1).
Note also that for c = 0 and e(ρ1) = 1 (68) is violated. Thus, by continuity of V and Φ in
equilibrium limc→0 e1(ρ1) < 1.

Proof of Proposition 26: Define V (ρ) := ρ
2
. At t = 1, the agency’s expected intertemporal
profit from shirking and announcing rt = 1 is equal to Υ(ρ1, ê1) + δV (ρ
−
1 ). The intertemporal
profit from acquiring information is equal to Υ(ρ1, ê1)−c+ δ2
[




. Fix ρ1 ∈ (0, 1).
An equilibrium in which e1(ρ1) = 1 exists if and only if
δV (ρ1) ≤ δV (ρ1)− c. (69)












Substituting for V (·) and simplifying yields




As δ(ρ1) is continuous and increasing in ρ1, then δ < δ(ρ1) is equivalent to ρ1 > ρu(δ);
moreover, as δ(0) = 4c, then e1(ρ1) > 0 only if δ > 4c. The proof that δ > δ(ρ1) is necessary
and sufficient for an equilibrium in which e1 ∈ (0, 1) follows standard arguments.
Next, fix δ and ρ1. Note also that, for c = 0, e(ρ1) = 1 satisfies (69). Continuity of Υ and
V thus ensure that in equilibrium limc→0 e1(ρ1) = 1. 
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Online Appendix F
In this appendix we present and analyze the model with observable information acquisition.
The model and the main result of this appendix (Proposition 27) are presented in Subsection
F.1. The analysis of an auxiliary game needed in the proof of Proposition 27 is carried out in
Subsection F.2. Subsection F.3 contains the proof of Proposition 27.
F.1 The model
Fees. Each period, firms and investors form beliefs regarding the probability that the strate-
gic agency will truthfully report what it observes. Let ât denote the beginning-of-period-t belief
that, conditional on acquiring information and observing qt = −1, the strategic agency truth-
fully assigns the rating rt = −1. We maintain the notation êt for the beginning-of-period-t
belief that the strategic agency will acquire information in period t, and set β = 1 to reduce
notation. So the contingent fee is
φt(rt) =
E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ât] if rt = 1;0 if rt = −1. (70)
while the upfront fee is φt(1) = φt(−1) = P(rt = 1|ρt, êt, ât)E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ât].
Timing. The timing within period t is as follows. The agency first decides whether or not
to acquire information. In case the agency shirks the game moves on to the next period. This
captures the idea that a regulatory authority prevents the agency from rating firm t in case
the agency is caught shirking. In case it chose to acquire information and observed qt = 1
the agency publicly announces the rating rt = 1. If it observed qt = −1 the agency chooses
whether to truthfully assign rt = −1, or inflate the rating and assign rt = 1. The agency then
receives φt(rt), all players observe qt and the game moves on to the next period.
Strategies and Payoffs. A stationary strategy for the agency now comprises a pair
(
e(·), a(·)),
where e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and a : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], specifying respectively the probability of acquir-
ing information and the probability of truthfully assigning the rating rt = −1 conditional on
observing qt = −1, both expressed as a function of the agency’s reputation ρt. The payoffs
are as in Section 2. The next definition adapts the equilibrium concept of that section.
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(i) in period t, the strategic agency acquires information with probability e(ρt) and, con-






maximizes the agency’s expected intertemporal profit given ρt+1 =
Ψ(ρt, rt, qt), where
36
Ψ(ρt, rt, qt) :=

ρt
ρt+(1−ρt)êt if qt = 1 = rt and ρt > 0;
ρt
ρt+(1−ρt)êtât if qt = −1 = rt and ρt > 0;
0 if rt = ∅, or qt = −1 = −rt, or ρt = 0;
(iii) firms and investors’ beliefs satisfy êt = e(ρt) and ât = a(ρt).
In equilibrium investors correctly infer the probabilities with which the strategic agency
chooses to acquire information and to truthfully assign rt = −1 when observing qt = −1,
and these choices are optimal for the agency. Firms and investors’ beliefs are updated using
Bayes’ rule whenever possible. The agency loses its reputation whenever it is caught shirking.
If it acquires information and qt = 1 then reputation is updated based on the belief êt = e(ρt)
alone, that is, reputation jumps up to
ρ+t :=
ρt
ρt + (1− ρt)e(ρt)
.
By contrast, two cases arise if the agency acquires information and qt = −1: rt = 1 reveals
that the agency inflated the rating (and thus, that the agency is strategic), and rt = −1 that
the agency truthfully reported what it observed. In the latter case reputation is updated




ρt + (1− ρt)e(ρt)a(ρt)
.
We proceed to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the strategic agency. If the agency
shirks, the agency is revealed to be strategic and the game moves on to the next period. So in
36We let rt = ∅ denote the case in which the agency shirks in period t.
37As usual zero-probability events are dealt with by assuring that ρt = 0 is an absorbing state of the Markov
process, and by ascribing any misreporting to the strategic agency.
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order to obtain a positive payoff the agency is now forced to acquire information. Conditional
on acquiring information, the agency can inflate the rating in case qt = −1 or truthfully
report what it observes. Inflating the rating guarantees the fee φt(1). The downside is that
the agency could lose its reputation: either qt = 1 in which case ρt+1 = ρ
+
t , or qt = −1 in
which case ρt+1 = 0. By contrast, truthfully reporting what the agency observes lowers the
probability of receiving φt(1) to just
1
2
, but could induce a reputation boost: either qt = 1 in
which case ρt+1 = ρ
+
t , or qt = −1 in which case ρt+1 = ρ++t . By virtue of Bellman’s Principle
of Optimality an equilibrium with value function V (·) therefore satisfies the Bellman equation






















We show later that V (0) = 0. Hence, the strategic agency is either indifferent between




V (ρ++) in which case inflating the




V (ρ++) in which case truthful reporting is
uniquely optimal.
The following proposition is the main result of this appendix.
Proposition 27. With observable information acquisition:
1. if δ < 2
3−2c then upfront fees improve expected social welfare relative to contingent fees;
2. if δ > 2
3−2c then expected social welfare is the same whether fees are upfront or contingent.
F.2 An Auxiliary Game
We analyze in this subsection the auxiliary game in which, by assumption, the strategic agency
(i) shirks if ρt = 0, and (ii) acquires information if ρt > 0. Hence, e(0) = 0 and e(ρ) = 1
for all ρ > 0, and in this setting a stationary strategy for the agency is simply a mapping
a : (0, 1] → [0, 1] specifying the probability of truthfully assigning the rating rt = −1 when
observing qt = −1, as a function of the agency’s reputation in period t. Our objective is to
prove the following result:
Proposition 28. Let δ < 2
3−2c . There exists a unique equilibrium of the auxiliary game. Its
value function, Ṽ (·), is strictly increasing and continuous over (0, 1], and Ṽ (1) > 0.
We start with two simple lemmas. Define, Ξ(·, ·) : (0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ R such that
Ξ(ρ, e, a) :=
ρ+ (1− ρ)ea
ρ+ (1− ρ)e(2− a)
.
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Note that E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ât] = Ξ(ρt, êt, ât) for all ρt > 0, and that Ξ(·, ·, ·) is continuous,
weakly increasing in ρ and in a, weakly decreasing in e, Ξ(ρ, e, a) > 0, and Ξ(1, e, a) =
Ξ(ρ, e, 1) = Ξ(ρ, 0, a) = 1.
Given a function a : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ† :=
0 if ρ = 0,ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)a(ρ) if ρ > 0.
Lemma 13. In any equilibrium of the auxiliary game with value function Ṽ (·), for all ρ > 0,if δṼ (ρ†) > Ξ(ρ, 1, a(ρ)) then a(ρ) = 1,if δṼ (ρ†) < Ξ(ρ, 1, a(ρ)) then a(ρ) = 0.
Proof: By virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,
Ṽ (ρ) = max
{














for all ρ > 0, and the choice implied by a(ρ) maximizes the right-hand side of (71).

Lemma 14. In any equilibrium of the auxiliary game,





























≥ Ṽ (ρ), for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The lemma follows from Bellman’s Principle of Optimality together with the obser-
vations that (a) a(ρ) = 1 implies ρ† = ρ, (b) ρ = 1 implies ρ† = 1, (c) Ξ(1, 1, a) = 1 for all
a ∈ [0, 1], and (d) Ξ(·, 1, ·) is weakly increasing in both variables.

Proof of Proposition 28: Define ρ and a implicitly by
Ξ(ρ, 1, 0) = δ






 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707069 
and
Ξ(0, 1, a) = δ





respectively. As δ < 2






, we have ρ < 1 and a < 1. Noting that




) the right-hand side in (72) and (73) is strictly positive whereas Ξ(0, 1, 0) = 0
yields ρ > 0 and a > 0. Thus ρ ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1).
We now show that there is a unique equilibrium of the auxiliary game, and that the
equilibrium satisfies a(ρ) = 0 if ρ ≥ ρa(ρ) ∈ (0, a] if ρ ∈ (0, ρ). (74)
We will first proceed by induction to show that there can exist at most one equilibrium. We
will then argue that the inductive procedure yields an equilibrium.
As a preliminary step observe that, as δ < 2














. Hence, by Lemma 14,
Ṽ (ρ) =




for all ρ > 0.
The inductive procedure starts as follows. Combining (72) and (75) any equilibrium must
be such that, for all ρ > ρ :
Ξ(ρ, 1, 0) > δṼ (ρ†).
Thus, by Lemma 13, if an equilibrium exists it must satisfy a(ρ) = 0 for all ρ > ρ. A similar
argument shows that in fact the same must be true for ρ = ρ.
By contrast, consider ρ ∈ (0, ρ). The combination of (72), (75), and Lemma 13 shows that
a(ρ) = 0 is impossible in equilibrium. Similarly, the combination of (73), (75) and Lemma 13
shows that a(ρ) > a is impossible in equilibrium. Thus, any equilibrium must satisfy (74).
By Lemma 13 this in turn implies that the indifference condition
δṼ (ρ†) = Ξ(ρ, 1, a(ρ)) (76)
must hold for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ).
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Next define ρ1 such that
ρ =
ρ1
ρ1 + (1− ρ1)a
.
Thus ρ1 < ρ. By construction of ρ1 and property (74), in any equilibrium: ρ
† ≥ ρ for all
ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ). (76), (74) and (75) now pin down a unique candidate equilibrium a(ρ) for each
ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ) (which moreover is continuous in ρ). Repeating the step above with ρ1 instead
of ρ yields ρ2 < ρ1 and a unique candidate equilibrium a(ρ) for each ρ ∈ [ρ2, ρ1), and so on.
This defines a sequence {ρn} where, for all n, ρn = ρn+1ρn+1+(1−ρn+1)a . As a < 1, ρn → 0. This
inductive procedure therefore pins down a unique candidate equilibrium, whose value function
is continuous over (0, 1] (see (75)). That this candidate equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium
is a consequence of the one-shot deviation principle.
It remains only to show that the value function Ṽ of the unique equilibrium is strictly
increasing over the interval (0, 1]. We proceed by induction. Ṽ is trivially increasing over
[ρ, 1]. Next, suppose that we can find ρa and ρb with ρ > ρb > ρa ≥ ρ1 and Ξ(ρa, 1, a(ρa)) ≥





and Ṽ (ρ†b) > Ṽ (ρ
†
a). The latter inequality contradicts Lemma 13. Hence, Ξ(ρa, 1, a(ρa)) <
Ξ(ρb, 1, a(ρb)). (75) thus yields Ṽ (ρa) < Ṽ (ρb) and establishes that Ṽ is increasing over [ρ1, 1].
Repeating the step above with ρ1 instead of ρ, and so on, establishes that Ṽ is increasing over
(0, 1].

F.3 Proof of Proposition 27
Define Ξ(·, ·, ·) : (0, 1]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]× → R such that
Ξ(ρ, e, a) :=
ρ+ (1− ρ)ea
ρ+ (1− ρ)e(2− a)
.
Note that E[qt|rt = 1, ρt, êt, ât] = Ξ(ρt, êt, ât) for all ρt > 0, and that Ξ(·, ·, ·) is continuous,
weakly increasing in ρ and in a, weakly decreasing in e, Ξ(ρ, e, a) > 0, and Ξ(1, e, a) =
Ξ(ρ, e, 1) = Ξ(ρ, 0, a) = 1.
Given two functions e : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and a : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], define
ρ+ :=
0 if ρ = 0,ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) if ρ > 0,
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and
ρ++ :=
0 if ρ = 0,ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ)a(ρ) if ρ > 0.
Lemma 15. In any equilibrium, with V (·) denoting the value function of the equilibrium:
1. e(0) = a(0) = V (0) = 0,
2. e(ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0,
3. for all ρ > 0:
V (ρ) = (77)
max
{














Proof: Consider an arbitrary equilibrium; by virtue of Bellman’s Principle of Optimality,
since ρ = 0 is an absorbing state, a(0) > 0 implies 0 ≥ 1
2
E[qt|rt = 1, 0, e(0), a(0)]. However,
if a(0) > 0 then E[qt|rt = 1, 0, e(0), a(0)] = a(0)2−a(0) > 0. Thus, by contradiction, a(0) = 0 and
the fee of the agency with reputation ρt = 0 is 0. As c > 0, for ρt = 0 the agency’s expected
intertemporal profit from acquiring information in period t is strictly negative. This implies
e(0) = 0 and V (0) = 0.












Thus e(1) = 1, since each period the agency’s payoff from shirking is 0. Suppose now that
e(ρ̂) = 0 for some ρ̂ > 0, and ρt = ρ̂. Then by acquiring information in period t the agency
would (i) command in period t the fee Ξ(ρ̂, 0, a(ρ̂)) = 1 and (ii) guarantee itself ρt+1 = 1. In
other words, the agency’s expected intertemporal profit from acquiring information in period
t equals V (1). But then acquiring information strictly dominates shirking, contradicting
the initial assumption that e(ρ̂) = 0. This shows that e(ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0. We can
thus compute the value function of the equilibrium by conditioning on the strategic agency
acquiring information, yielding the Bellman equation (77). The first expression on the right-
hand side is the expected intertemporal profit conditional on acquiring information and lying
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about qt in case qt = −1. The second expression on the right-hand side is the expected
intertemporal profit conditional on acquiring information and truthfully assigning rt = −1 in
case qt = −1.

Proposition 29. Let δ > 2
3−2c . There exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium:
1. e(0) = a(0) = 0,
2. e(ρ) = a(ρ) = 1, for all ρ > 0.
Proof: Let V̂ denote the value function corresponding to the strategy described in the state-




1−δ > 0 for all, ρ > 0. By virtue of the
one-shot deviation principle if no single deviation is profitable then the strategy considered
is an equilibrium. It is easy to see that there is no profitable deviation if ρt = 0. It is also
clear that if ρt > 0 then shirking is not a profitable deviation. So we only have to check that
if ρt > 0 then lying about qt when qt = −1 is not profitable either. That is, we have to check







, which is equivalent to δ ≥ 2
3−2c .
We proceed to show that the strategy described in the statement of the proposition is the




1−δ > 0 for all ρ > 0. Therefore
a(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0 implies e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0. Next, suppose that an equilibrium exists
such that a(ρ̂) < 1 for some ρ̂ ∈ (0, 1). By virtue of (77),
Ξ(ρ̂, e(ρ̂), a(ρ̂)) ≥ δV (ρ̂++).
If a(ρ̂++) were equal to 1 we would then have (recall, from Lemma 15, e(ρ̂) > 0),
1 > Ξ(ρ̂, e(ρ̂), a(ρ̂)) ≥ δ
( 1
2




that is, δ < 2
3−2c . Hence by contradiction a(ρ̂
++) < 1. We can thus repeat the steps above
with ρ̂++ instead of ρ̂, and so on. This process determines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all
n:
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By (i)-(ii), either a(ρn) → 1 or ρn → 1. Hence, taking limits in (iii) yields (using continuity
of Ξ(·, ·, ·) and the fact that Ξ(1, e, a) = Φ(ρ, e, 1) = 1 for all ρ, e and a):
Ξ(1, 1, 1) ≥ δ
(





This simplifies to δ ≤ 2
3−2c .

Lemma 16. Let δ < 2
3−2c . There exists ρ ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1) such that, in any equilibrium:
1. e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ,
2. a(ρ) ≤ a for all ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Since Ξ(1, e, a) = 1 for all e and a and Ξ(·, ·, ·) is continuous, (77) yields V (ρ) > 0 for
all ρ sufficiently close to 1. But V (ρ) > 0 implies e(ρ) = 1.
Next, define a implicitly by
Ξ(0, 1, a) = δ





Observe that a < 1 since δ < 2
3−2c , and a > 0 since the right-hand side of (80) is strictly
positive.
Suppose that we can find an equilibrium with a(ρ̂) > a for ρ̂ > 0. Then, by (77) and
Bellman’s Principle of Optimality, δV (ρ̂++) ≥ Ξ(ρ̂, e(ρ̂), a(ρ̂)). Combined with (80), this
yields V (ρ̂++) > Ξ(1,1,1)−c
1− δ
2
. Yet, given δ < 2
3−2c , we have
V (1) = max














yielding V (ρ̂++) > V (1), which cannot be.

In what follows let ã(·) denote the unique equilibrium of the auxiliary game analyzed in
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Subsection F.2, Ṽ (·) the corresponding value function, and for δ < 2
3−2c define ρ̃ implicitly byρ̃ = 0 if Ṽ (ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0,Ṽ (ρ̃) = 0 otherwise.





We will now show that there can be at most one equilibrium for δ < 2
3−2c . The proof is
somewhat complicated. To help the reader get the gist of the argument, we defer the main
result and start with a slightly weaker version of the result, by focusing on the class of equilibria
with a non-decreasing value function.
Lemma 17. Let δ < 2
3−2c . In any equilibrium whose value function is non-decreasing:
1. if ρ̃ = 0: e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0,
2. if ρ̃ > 0: e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ̃ and e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃).
Proof: We first show the proof of the lemma for the case in which ρ̃ = 0. The case ρ̃ > 0 is
considered at the end.
Define ρ1 implicitly by
ρ =
ρ1
ρ1 + (1− ρ1)a
,
with ρ and a satisfying the conditions stated in Lemma 16. Thus ρ1 < ρ (since a < 1), and in
any equilibrium ρ++ ≥ ρ for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
The proof is by induction: we have e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ and we proceed to show that
e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
Step 1: for all ρ ≥ ρ1, Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) ≥ Ξ(ρ, 1, ã(ρ)). If e(ρ) = 1 then a(ρ) = ã(ρ) and so
the result is trivial. Suppose now that e(ρ) < 1, and Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) < Ξ(ρ, 1, ã(ρ)). Then
a(ρ) < ã(ρ), which in turn implies
Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) ≥ δV (ρ++) = δṼ (ρ++) > δṼ (ρ†) ≥ Ξ(ρ, 1, ã(ρ)).
The first inequality follows from (77) and a(ρ) < 1. The subsequent equality follows from
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noting that ρ++ ≥ ρ while V (ρ) = Ṽ (ρ) for all ρ ≥ ρ. The second inequality is due to the
fact that since a(ρ) < ã(ρ), ρ++ > ρ†, while Ṽ is strictly increasing (Proposition 28). The last
inequality follows from (71) and ã(ρ) > 0.
Step 2: for all ρ ≥ ρ1, Ṽ (ρ++) ≥ Ṽ (ρ†). First, suppose a(ρ) = 0. Then ρ++ = 1 and, since
Ṽ (·) is increasing on (0, 1] (Proposition 28), Ṽ (ρ++) ≥ Ṽ (ρ†).
Next, suppose ã(ρ) = 0. Then ρ† = 1 and Ξ(ρ, 1, ã(ρ)) ≥ δṼ (ρ†) = δṼ (1). Therefore,
if we had Ṽ (ρ++) < Ṽ (ρ†) we would have (by Step 1) Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) > δṼ (ρ++), and since
V (ρ) = Ṽ (ρ) for all ρ ≥ ρ, Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) > δV (ρ++). Given (77), this would imply a(ρ) = 0,
and ρ++ = 1. But then Ṽ (ρ++) = Ṽ (ρ†).
Finally, suppose a(ρ) > 0 and ã(ρ) > 0. We then obtain, in view of (71), (77), Step 1 and
V (ρ) = Ṽ (ρ) for all ρ ≥ ρ,
δṼ (ρ++) = δV (ρ++) = Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) ≥ Ξ(ρ, 1, ã(ρ)) = δṼ (ρ†).
Step 3: for all ρ ≥ ρ1, V (ρ) ≥ Ṽ (ρ). Using V (ρ) = Ṽ (ρ) for all ρ ≥ ρ, if V (·) is non-decreasing
then (77), Step 1 and Step 2 yield
V (ρ) ≥ max
{














for all ρ ≥ ρ1. Comparing (81) with (71) gives V (ρ) ≥ Ṽ (ρ), for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
We conclude from Step 3 that V (ρ) > 0 for all ρ ≥ ρ1, which in turn implies that e(ρ) = 1
for all ρ ≥ ρ1. We can thus repeat Steps 1-3 with ρ1 instead of ρ, and so on. This process
defines a sequence {ρn} such that, for all n, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρn, and ρn = ρn+1ρn+1+(1−ρn+1)a .
As a < 1, ρn → 0. Thus e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.
We now show the proof of the lemma for the case in which ρ̃ > 0. Reasoning as in the
previous case shows that V (ρ) > 0 for all ρ > ρ̃, and therefore that e(ρ) = 1 and V (ρ) = Ṽ (ρ)




1−δ > 0, from which follows that e(ρ) > 0 for
all ρ > 0; if this were not the case, acquiring information would yield the strategic agency
V (1) > 0. Hence, we are only left to show that e(ρ̃) = 1. Suppose that e(ρ̃) < 1. Then
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ρ̃+ > ρ̃, and so Ṽ (ρ̃+) > 0. Hence, we obtain
V (ρ̃) ≥ 1
2






























= Ṽ (ρ̃+) > 0.
The first line follows from (77), and the second from noting that Ξ(ρ̃, e(ρ̃), a(ρ̃)) = Ξ(ρ̃+, 1, ã(ρ̃)).
The third line is obtained by noting that, since e(ρ̃+) = 1 = e(ρ̃++), the trade off between
lying and telling the truth faced by the strategic agency with reputation ρ̃ is the same as the
trade off faced by the strategic agency with reputation ρ̃+ in the auxiliary game. Therefore,
a(ρ̃) = ã(ρ̃+). The sequence above yields V (ρ̃) > 0, and so e(ρ̃) = 1.

Lemma 18. Let δ < 2
3−2c . In any equilibrium:
1. if ρ̃ = 0: e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0,
2. if ρ̃ > 0: e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ̃ and e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃).
Proof: We will show the proof of the lemma for the case in which ρ̃ = 0. We omit the proof
of the case ρ̃ > 0, which is very similar to the case we consider.




1−δ > 0. It ensues that e(ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0; if this were not
the case, acquiring information would yield the strategic agency V (1) > 0. Since a(ρ) < 1 for
all ρ > 0 (Lemma 16) Bellman’s Principle of Optimality yields
V (ρ) = Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ))− c+ δ
2
V (ρ+). (82)
Define ρ1 implicitly by
ρ =
ρ1
ρ1 + (1− ρ1)a
,
with ρ and a satisfying the conditions stated in Lemma 16. Thus ρ1 < ρ (since a < 1), and in
any equilibrium ρ++ ≥ ρ for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
The proof is by induction: we have e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ and we proceed to show that
e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
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Suppose that we can find ρ ≥ ρ1 such that e(ρ) < 1. We claim that e(ρ) < 1 implies
e(ρ+) < 1. To see this, observe that if e(ρ+) = 1 then
V (ρ) ≥ 1
2
































The first line follows from (77), and the second from noting that Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ)) = Ξ(ρ+, 1, a(ρ)).
The third line is obtained by noting that, since e(ρ+) = 1 = e(ρ++), the trade-off between
lying and telling the truth faced by the strategic agency with reputation ρ is the same as the
trade-off faced by the strategic agency with reputation ρ+ in the auxiliary game. Therefore,
a(ρ) = ã(ρ+). The sequence (83) yields V (ρ) ≥ Ṽ (ρ+) > 0, and so e(ρ) = 1, contradicting
our initial assumption.
Since we showed that e(ρ) < 1 implies e(ρ+) < 1, if we can find ρ ≥ ρ1 such that e(ρ) < 1
then there exists a strictly increasing sequence {ρn} with e(ρn) < 1 for all n, and ρn+1 = ρ+n .
Let ρ̂ = limn→∞ ρn; by Lemma 16, ρ̂ < ρ+ z for all z > 0, as otherwise for n large enough we
would get e(ρn) = 1. As ρ < 1 this is turn implies that limn→∞ e(ρn) = 1.
We next claim that for all ε > 0 there exists N such that, for all n > N :
| Ξ(ρn, e(ρn), a(ρn))− Ξ(ρ̂, 1, ã(ρ̂)) |< ε. (84)
To see this, suppose that ã(ρ̂) > 0 (the case ã(ρ̂) = 0 can be dealt with in a similar way).
Hence,




Ξ(ρn, e(ρn), 0) = Ξ(ρ̂, 1, 0) < Ξ(ρ̂, 1, ã(ρ̂)) = δṼ (ρ̂
†) ≤ δṼ (1),
from which follows that, for n large enough, a(ρ) > 0. Hence δV (ρ++n ) = Ξ(ρn, e(ρn), a(ρn))
for all n large enough. Since, ρ++n ≥ ρ for all n, we obtain
δṼ (ρ++n ) = Ξ(ρn, e(ρn), a(ρn)), (86)
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for all n large enough. That (84) holds for sufficiently large n now follows from (85), (86) and
continuity of Ṽ (·) (see Proposition 28).







Ξ(ρn+k, e(ρn+k), a(ρn+k))− c
)
for all n. Moreover, we showed above that for all ε > 0 there exists N such that, for all n > N ,





















∣∣V (ρn)− Ṽ (ρ̂)∣∣ < η.
As Ṽ (ρ̂) > 0, we conclude that V (ρn) > 0, implying e(ρn) = 1. This contradicts the construc-
tion of the sequence {ρn}. Thus e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ1.
We can now repeat the steps above with ρ1 instead of ρ, and so on. This process defines a
sequence { ˆ̂ρn} such that, for all n, e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ˆ̂ρn, and ˆ̂ρn =
ˆ̂ρn+1
ˆ̂ρn+1+(1− ˆ̂ρn+1)a
. As a < 1,
ˆ̂ρn → 0. Thus e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.

Proposition 30. Let δ < 2
3−2c . There exists a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is such
that, for some cutoff ρc:
1. e(0) = a(0) = 0;
2. e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ∈ (ρ̃, 1], and e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃);
3. a(ρ) = 0 for all ρ ∈ [ρc, 1], and a(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, ρc).
Proof: We take up the case in which ρ̃ > 0. The case in which ρ̃ = 0 is similar and simpler,
we therefore omit the proof.
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By virtue of the one-shot deviation principle, the following strategy is an equilibrium:
e(0) = a(0) = 0;
e(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ̃;
ρ̃ = ρ
ρ+(1−ρ)e(ρ) for all ρ < ρ̃;
a(ρ) = ã(ρ) for all ρ ≥ ρ̃;
a(ρ) = ã(ρ̃) for all ρ ∈ (0, ρ̃).
Uniqueness follows from Lemma 18. The existence of the cutoff ρc is a consequence of
Proposition 28.

Proposition 31. Let δ 6= 2
3−2c . There is a unique equilibrium with observable information
acquisition and contingent fees. In this equilibrium, if δ > 2
3−2c , then e(ρ) = a(ρ) = 1 for all
ρ > 0. If instead δ < 2
3−2c then the equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs ρc1 < 1 and ρc2 < 1
such that:
1. e(ρ) = 1 if ρ > ρc1 and e(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) if ρ ∈ (0, ρc1);
2. a(ρ) = 0 if ρ > ρc2 and a(ρ) > 0 if ρ ∈ (0, ρc2).
Furthermore, e(0) = a(0) = 0 for all δ.
Proof: Follows from Propositions 29 and 30. 
Proposition 32. There is a unique equilibrium with observable information acquisition and
upfront fees. In this equilibrium, e(ρ) = a(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium of the game with observable information acquisition and fees
received upfront by the agency such that e(0) = a(0) = 0. Let V denote the value function.




1−δ > 0. Hence e(1) = 1. It immediately follows that
e(ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0; if this were not the case, acquiring information would yield the strategic
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P(rt = 1|ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ))Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), a(ρ))− c+
δ
2
V (ρ+) , (87)









for all ρ > 0. Moreover, no matter e(ρ), we have P(rt = 1|ρ, e(ρ), 1)Ξ(ρ, e(ρ), 1) = 1. This
implies that we can find a < 1 such that, either (i) V (ρ) > 0 or (ii) a(ρ) < a and V (ρ++) = 0.
Case (ii) is however impossible as it implies the existence of a sequence {ρn} tending to 1 as
n → ∞ and such that V (ρn) = 0 for all n. Therefore, V (ρ) > 0 for all ρ > 0. It ensues that
e(ρ) = a(ρ) = 1 for all ρ > 0.

Proof of Proposition 27: Follows from Propositions 31 and 32.

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Online Appendix G
In this appendix we characterize the set of socially optimal fee structures. Consider a fee
structure such that: if ρt = ρ1 then φt(1) = a and φt(−1) = b while if ρt = 0 then φt(1) = y
and φt(−1) = z. The fee structure is socially optimal if: firms prefer to get a rating as long
as ρt = ρ1 and their beliefs satisfy êt = 1 (call this condition 1) and there exist an equilibrium









· 1 + 1
2
· 0),
where the left-hand side is the firm’s expected payment to the agency and the right-hand side
is the firm’s expected revenue from investors if firm t decides to obtain a rating for ρt = ρ1
and êt = 1. Condition 1 is equivalent to:
a+ b ≤ 1.
Condition 2 boils down to:
a− b
2




















where the left-hand side the CRA’s short-run incentive to shirk and the right-hand side is the
CRA’s long-run incentive to acquire information for ρt = ρ1 and êt = 1. Rearranging terms,


















The largest set of a and b for which this condition holds is obtained for y = z = 0, in which
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